AN AMICABLE SOLUTION TO THE J&K ISSUE

 The dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir stretches back to 1948 and the problem has been further complicated by the Pakistan sponsored insurgency after 1989 -90. The dispute is not only a territorial and a political problem, but also an emotive issue deeply affected by the internal dynamics of India, Pakistan and the people of the J&K state. Any solution to the protracted problem must satisfy the differing perceptions and aspirations of all the parties involved.

The rigid stands adopted by the three stake-holders to the conflict prevent accommodation and any settlement, unless all the competing parties are willing to be more flexible and accept some level of compromise to their stated claims. Any viable approach in tackling the issues must not only respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity concerns of India and Pakistan, but also the popular aspirations of the people of J&K. The key to resolve the issue lies with the governments of India and Pakistan, as the people of J&K and POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) see themselves as either victims or hostage to the policies of one or both the States. The complex character of the dispute cannot be solved without the active cooperation of the two States and Pakistan has to refrain from supporting the various terror outfits operating at their behest in the J&K, and assist in enabling an environment conducive for meaningful talks.

It also needs to be understood that the aspirations of the different regions of J&K are not similar. The people of Jammu and Ladakh, and the Gujjars and the Paharis of the hills do not support the separatists, excepting the more vocal Sunni population of the Kashmir valley. The Sunni population of the valley have identified more closely to the separatist cause and their proxies in Pakistan. In fact, these five districts in the valley, out of the total 24 districts in the entire state, have a population of only 30% but have been given disproportionate amount of importance and representation - both in the state legislative assembly and at various forums. It needs to be realised that they, through the “United Jehadi Council” or the “Hurriyat” do not represent the aspirations of the entire state. We thus, need to involve adequate representation of the people from the other regions of the state in any future talks, as a composite delegation that represent all sections and elected members, rather than just the Hurriyat, who focus on the concerns of only the separatists and the alienated people of the valley. 

Unfortunately the various think tanks and the official agencies of the Central Government in the past have also neglected the demands of the other regions, so much so that the refugees of 1947 who had migrated from Pakistan to Jammu still continue to be stateless, and without any rights of citizens. On the contrary, the migrants from Tibet after the Chinese ingress of 1950, have been given the status of state subjects. The resettlement of the Kashmiri Pandits in the valley remains unresolved as they fear for safety and feel unwelcome. This is certainly not an example of fair-play that ensures equal treatment to all the regions and communities. The issue of the Northern Areas, Gilgit and Baltistan and their unauthorised annexation by Pakistan is hardly ever discussed by India or the so called Hurriyat who claim to represent and voice the concerns of the people of J&K. Thus, the Kashmir issue is driven by a complex network of multiple interlocking dimensions, which requires a skilful compromise of the conflicting demands. To resolve this complicated dispute we need to identify and address the entire range of issues that have relevance to the possible solution of the J&K issue. These are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Issues Relevant to the Possible solution of the J&K issue

2. The external dimension of the Kashmir issue concerns the territorial status, the geographical borders and the applicability and the relevance of  the outdated UN Security Council Resolution of 1948, which have been overtaken by subsequent events, and the successive democratic elections in the Indian part of the J&K during the last six decades in the state. Pakistan continues to raise the outdated issues, despite the fact that she has not pulled back the troops from the POK, which was the prerequisite for the promised plebiscite. Implications of the illegal ceding of the Shagksham valley to China by Pakistan also needs to be factored in while considering the external dimension, as also the unauthorised integration of the Northern Areas and Baltistan by Pakistan. The internal dimension examining the aspirations of the people of the J&K must include all the regions including those of Jammu and Ladakh. In fact, the Muslim population of the Jammu and Ladakh also endorse the case for accession of the state with India. Even the Shia community in the valley, which is about 12% does not support the separatists cause. However, the demand for good governance, greater autonomy, economic development and greater trade, commerce and cultural exchange across the LOC/ borders is widely accepted, by all the regions, except the Hurriyat, who as the proxy of Pakistan plays the negative role of strikes, encourages non-cooperation and incites violence . The Hurriyat feels at-home talking to their Pakistani masters and avoids talks with the Indian Government. This clearly reflects their affiliations, preferences and priorities, yet they clamour to represent the voice of the J&K?

It is true that the Central and the state governments in the past have made serious mistakes by rigged elections, central meddling in the state, corruption, denial of legitimate demands, use of force and large scale arrests, which resulted in unprecedented anger and alienation in the valley. This alienation was exploited by Pakistan by infiltrating jehadi cadres, arms and ammunition in the Kashmir valley. This has been corrected to a large extent by the firm action against the insurgents by the armed forces, civic action programmes and the economic development activities by the central and state governments. The action by the armed forces has been generally fair and supportive, with the use of minimum force, barring few aberrations. The armed forces have had to operate in difficult situations, where a hostile vernacular media and foreign sponsored propoganda and the foreign funded Human Rights organizations have attempted to malign the armed forces. Although the majority of the civil population is no longer misguided and prefer to lead a peaceful life, the hardcore militants persist in their sinister designs, actively supported by Pakistan.

Such a situation would continue as long as Pakistan with her anti-India agenda and her proxies in the state will not reconcile. This is a factor which is unlikely to change while we address the internal dynamics of the J&K. The main participants in the future dialogue process thus, should be the elected representatives of the people from the three regions. The Hurriyat should be invited as one of the players representing the seperatists, but should not be given undue importance in the parleys - even if they decline to participate, which they are most likely to do unless Pakistan directs to them to do otherwise. The present thrust on the economic development in the state, greater devolution of powers and mainstreaming with the rest of the country should continue, enabling a conducive atmosphere for the redressal of grievances. Conflict resolution would take considerable time and requires persistent effort by all the agencies and the stake holders.

Alternatives and options

3. Given the above background , what are the various alternatives and options to resolve the complex internal and the external dimensions of the Kashmir issue? Some analysts have  suggested that we should adopt the model of the Northern Ireland  between the Republic of Ireland and UK , the so called “Good Friday Agreement '' for settlement in the J&K. A dispassionate examination would reveal that there are differing conditions and environment between the two. In the Northern Ireland there were similar cultural, linguistic and economic conditions as those prevailing in the Republic of Ireland, with a more homogeneous society. The ground realities of diverse religious, multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic and differing social conditions in the J&K have to be considered, besides the deployment of the two armies on the live borders. However, a few aspects from the Irish model could be adopted with suitable modifications. Recognising and respecting the two identities of the two sovereign states of India and Pakistan in the respective territories along with the Kashmiri identity will have to be accepted by all, as the starting point.

Secondly, the peace process in Northern Ireland was driven by the determination of the British and the Irish states. Such an environment in our context is presently lacking and the cooperation of Pakistan would remain suspect and a question mark. Thirdly, Britsh-Irish inter -governmental cooperation was greatly facilitated by the European Union (EU), as both the states were members of the EU and accepted by the two as the forum to discuss the issues. Such a regional grouping is not available between India and Pakistan as the SAARC has not matured to take on such disputes. In the Irish model, the USA also acted as a facilitator and mediator, but the role of the third party as a mediator is not acceptable to India. The Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration(1999) do provide a broad framework for the two countries for talks provided there is evidence of political will in Pakistan. At times, there is often a demand in India to abolish article 370, particularly by some hardliners. Article 370 provides special status to Kashmir within the Indian union to maintain its exclusive identity as part of the accession instrument. Abrogation of this article would be a retrograde step. This article provides the legal basis for accession with India and should clearly be retained, as any tampering with this article will only harden the public opinion in the valley.

There is another controversial issue raised by political parties in the J&K, of repealing AFSPA from the state. This act enables the armed forces to operate in the conduct of anti-insurgency operations legally. Repealing of this article should only be done gradually from the districts where the situation has been normalised, based on the recommendations of the state. The Army and the PMF should also be withdrawn from the towns to the selected locations outside the urban centres, leaving the state police to handle law and order functions. The long term goal should be to strengthen the capacity and the calibre of the J&K police to undertake all the security tasks in the state. The Army's presence along the LOC and its anti- infiltration grid in the depth will have to be retained and cannot be diluted in the near terms, till the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Any talk of demilitarisation is also premature, till Pakistan dismantles its terror infrastructure and reduces its own forces from the LOC and POK.

4. An important lesson from the Irish model which could be adopted is the creation of an 'inter-ministerial joint council' between India and Pakistan, which would resolve all the inter-state disputes and take further steps to enhance mutual relations in trade, tourism, irrigation and power, education, sports  and cultural exchanges. This Joint council would have to operate directly under the two Prime Ministers to be meaningful. The most important step that needs to be taken is to accept the LOC as the geographic border between the two countries with suitable modifications to make it more realistic on the ground. This is the most difficult decision and the most important one failing which no normalisation would ever be possible except the status-quo situation as on today. This decision to convert the LOC as the border would lead ultimately to making it as the soft border and open up tremendous opportunities to both the sides and to the Kashmiri people; however forces in Pakistan, the Army as well as the Jehadis and their proxies in the J&K would resist and not let this happen. In such a scenario - which is most likely - resolving the Kashmir dispute and enhancing inter-state linkages, appears extremely difficult. At the same time it should be clear to all that any hopes of redrawing the borders by military actions or the aspirations of separatists for “Azadi” will not be realised or allowed to be fructified by India. The sooner this truth is realised across the borders and by their proxies in the J&K the better it would be for all, otherwise we would have to live with the existing situation.

There are some who advocate trifurcation of the state, however such a step would disturb the balance of the three regions and not resolve the issue, except, pushing the Kashmir valley further in the control of the separatist forces and eventual separation. Surely this is not a viable option for India or the Kashmiris themselves. The Centre should encourage the regional parties like the PDP and the NC to come up so that the regional aspirations of the local population are better understood, and these parties act as a 'buffer' between the Centre and the State. However, the authority of the central institutions – the Election Commission, The CAG, Central Vigilance Commission, and the Supreme Court should not be diluted.

What then is the ultimate solution?

 I am of the opinion, based on my very long tenures in all three regions, while serving in the army, both at the operating levels and in senior positions, that the J&K issue, because of the inflexible stand of Pakistan, will continue to remain unresolved and we will have to live with this reality. The Indian Army will have to remain deployed in the J&K in the national interests to guard the frontiers and provide the necessary security, stability and an environment for peace, development and integration of J&K with the rest of the country. The people of J&K would have to learn to accept the status-quo and get on with the opportunities this arrangement provides. The effects of economic development and globalisation, along with the people friendly policies of the government, easier travel facilities across the LOC, inter state trade and commerce and all round prosperity, will ultimately have a sobering effect on the public to accept the existing arrangements willingly. The relations, with Pakistan, hopefully would also improve over a period of time and become more amenable and business like, even if not entirely friendly.  Pakistan, due to its internal compulsions and the Army's own agenda, is unlikely to water down its claims over Kashmir. Some politicians in the Kashmir valley and the hard core separatists, even when marginalised, would continue to demand self-rule and greater autonomy. This, although adequately provided in the article 370, should be undertaken, within the parameters of the Constitution.

We should be prepared for Pakistan's and the Hurriyat's rigid and inflexible attitude and in fact even ignore them, and continue to pursue our national policies of  good governance, economic development, and people friendly policies and provide the necessary healing touch, while taking firm action against the insurgents in the J&K. The law and order and the policing of the urban centres should be completely handed over to the state police. The PMF and the Central police forces should be withdrawn, retaining the barest minimum for provision of security to the central institutions/ installations or for reinforcing the anti-infiltration grid. The state administration and its agencies involved in health services, public works, power and electricity should be strengthened and energised to deliver. At the diplomatic level we should expose Pakistan's double standards and involvement in the cross border terrorism in J&K. We should propose establishment of an Indo-Pak Joint Council for resolving the J&K entangle and for settlement of the related disputes between the two countries.

CHIEF OF STAFF IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR DURING ACTIVE INSURGENCY

The Army continues to surprise you in your transfers by providing you new challenges, as I found out again in March 1991, when I was posted out to HQ 15 Corps as the Chief of Staff (COS) to succeed Major General Surendra Nath, who was promoted as the Corps Commander. The surprise was not because of the appointment, as the COS of an operational Corps is a most coveted post, but because of the timing. I had just finished 18 months of my Divisional Command, which is somewhat briefer than the normal tenure of such Command.

HQ 15 Corps was stationed in Srinagar. This was a turbulent time in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The Pakistan sponsored insurgency was at its height, with the active support of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the militant cadres of Hizbul Mujahedeen (HM), and the Jamait-El-Islami (JEI). Initially this was an insurgent movement[1], but by 1991 it became an entirely terrorist organization, carrying out sabotage, subversion and ethnic cleansing of the ‘Pandit’ community.

The Indian Army was deployed not only to prevent infiltration through the LOC and guard the borders of India at this crucial position, but also to conduct ‘cordon and search’ activity in the urban areas of the state, to dominate its rural hinterland, secure important installations dispersed in different areas within it, conduct operational drills for securing its highways and escort convoys travelling on them. The army had to learn some of these tasks by ‘on the job’ training. Gradually, the Para-Military forces were also incorporated in the counter-insurgency grid, especially in the measures of protecting static installations and assisting in the road-opening operations. Protective measures against grenade attacks and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) were evolved with time, and a few vehicles were specially modified to clear the suspected IEDs. These improvisations took time and after some trial and error, we achieved a degree of success, though not without the loss of casualties.

There were many demands on the Army beyond its traditional responsibilities. In some cases it had to take on roles that were actually supposed to be undertaken by other organisations, such as the Police and the State administration. The State Police generally proved ineffective due to poor training, lack of leadership, and subversion of some of the personnel. In fact a battalion of the J&K Armed Police Battalion had to be disarmed as there were instances of serious disobedience within it. I recall the incident when the State Home Secretary (Mr Habib Rehman) and the DGP (Mr Bedi) were held hostage in the Police Control Room, requiring the Army to intervene firmly. We had to even move the Infantry Combat Vehicles to surround the area as a show of force, and we succeeded in breaking the siege and rescuing the two senior officials—without firing a single shot.  

While we could achieve these results because of our detailed planning, firm leadership and the commitment of our soldiers, such operations naturally drew on our already stretched resources. The Corps did not have adequate troops to plug the infiltration in the Uri, Kupwara, and Guraij Sectors as there were large areas being held by the units on the Line of Control. The COAS thus released 28 Inf Div ex Ladakh for deployment in the Valley sector. This involved denuding the Ladakh sector of dedicated reserves, the need for which was to be seriously felt during the Kargil War in May 1999, when we had to rush forces from elsewhere, which took time to move, acclimatise and deploy. 

However, during the time of the active insurgency in 1990 when the danger was more immediate and wide-spread in the Valley, the deployment appeared to be a sound move. Nonetheless, the reserves for the Ladakh sector should have been restored in a phased manner. This underscores the need for active vigilance and changing tactics at all times, as well as the risks of spreading a formation too thin in the mountain terrain. The Armed Forces, who are essentially trained to defend the nation from external threats, are being increasingly called in to manage internal matters for extended periods of time; it is bound to have an effect on their core tasks. This is something that the political leadership needs to be aware of and act upon, so that the Armed Forces are allowed to concentrate on the training and execution of their basic work. 

Fortunately, despite all this, we were able to bring the situation under reasonable control and apprehend a number of foreign militants—Pakistani, Afghan and a few Arabs as well. We had excellent support from the Security Advisor, Lt. General MA Zaki, the Governor, Shri G.C. Saxena (and later General K.V. Krishna Rao), and the civil administration. Additional battalions of BSF, CRPF and TA were inducted to guard installations and dominate urban areas. However these troops were not trained, equipped or prepared to fight an insurgency. The leadership of the Para–Military Forces did not understand the intricacies of operations, which often led to excessive casualties or damage on the ground to property and habitat. This in no way was due to the lack of calibre or the commitment of these forces, but due to their different orientation and ethos.

The J&K insurgency, unlike other insurgencies, has very active support from Pakistan—diplomatic, financial, political and military. Article 370, granting special status to J&K, though well intentioned, has been misused to heighten differences, and prevent its main-streaming with the rest of the country. Civil society and local media do not appear to be helping, and are visibly pro-separatists, which makes things more difficult. The vernacular media has been infiltrated by the anti-national elements and often support the militant cause. Military operations and economic development by themselves, in the absence of political initiatives to positively engage civil society, are inadequate to resolve the Kashmir issue.

As the COS of HQ 15 Corps, besides working with the civil administration and the Central Police Units, it was also essential to have active coordination with the Intelligence Agencies—IB, RAW, State CID, and Military and BSF Intelligence. The intelligence inputs were mostly out of date and inaccurate, besides being repetitive. I set myself the challenge of changing this unsatisfactory status, by introducing in the scheduled system an initiative of regular meetings at Corps HQ, with the representatives of all the key Intelligence organisations. This helped to communicate to them the focus and priority of information required by the Armed Forces, as well as increased the accountability of various organisations and speeded up both their and our responses to emergencies, since the face-to-face discussions reduced the possibility of misinterpretations that are inevitable when there are extended channels of communication.

The Sub-Area HQ at Badami Bagh Cantonment had a very important role in the Counter Insurgency operations, not only for the security of the Transit Camp, but also for the security of the Corps HQ, and that of the Detention Camp of the captured militants before they were handed over to the Civil Police. The Sub-Area HQ was also tasked with periodic search and cordon operations in the Srinagar town. During this period, we had very competent successive Sub-Area Commanders in Brigadiers NS Katoch and SPS Kanwar, who were both very successful in handling delicate missions, besides ensuring the security of the road up to the airfield.

The Commander of the JAKLI centre located adjacent to the Airfield was earmarked as the Garrison Commander for units housed around the Airfield. The accommodation for many additional units which were inducted in the Valley and 28 Inf Div was a major task. Before they could be actually deployed forward, they needed to be housed and given orientation training. This was done by getting on ground a mix of tented and pre-fabricated huts. Some were housed in schools or available government buildings. The Corps also established battle-schools to impart the Counter Insurgency (CI) training for all the incoming units. All this was possible due to commitment, teamwork, and the personal example of the leaders. It also is proof, if such proof is required, of the administrative and management capabilities of the Armed Forces, where through innovation and intelligence, resources are made maximum use of, to almost generate facilities out of ‘thin air’.

I found that my tenure as the COS was professionally very satisfying and educative. It also enabled me to interact periodically with the Governor, the Chief Secretary, DGP and other Formation Commanders. The Corps HQ received a large number of visitors, civil dignitaries, media personalities and military officers for briefings and fact-finding. An important lesson of the anti-insurgency operation was the need for clear-cut responsibilities, and the division of specific boundaries between various agencies and formations. Equally important was the principle of accountability for all the elements operating. In extended areas of responsibility, where the formations are operating in widely dispersed terrain, the timely response of anticipatory actions and delegation of authority to the subordinate commanders is of paramount importance. This needs to be bolstered by the principle of use of minimum force, and simultaneous goodwill missions for the benefit of the local populace.

We regularly undertook to translate these principles into action, later termed as ‘Sadbhavna’ operations. In this regard, the opening of schools and hospitals by the Armed Forces is an important initiative. All the formations undertook tasks like road-repairs, making culverts, apart from organizing health camps and distributing essential supplies, as the civil administration was practically non-existent. This had to proceed along with the basic tasks of guarding the borders, preventing infiltration attempts from across the LOC and training for the combat tasks—in fact, the commanders and the troops were very heavily committed in all these tasks all the time. This was also in addition to the responsibilities of winter stocking of stores, supplies, fuel and the relief of troops after their specified tenures. Provisioning for the Siachin glacier, and the winter isolated posts was another important responsibility.

 I recall an incident in the Siachin sector of 3 Inf Div when I was officiating as the Corps Commander. The Divisional Commander, Major General JS Dhillon, reported that a Pak Helicopter had violated our air-space in the central Glacier in the ‘Bahadur Complex’ and recommended that we should engage the helicopter should it repeat the intrusion. I approved the action and asked him to redeploy the ‘Igla’ missile and informed the HQ Northern Command of our plans, as it appeared a deliberate violation. The GOC reinforced the post with an ‘Igla’ missile and undertook suitable measures. The enemy helicopter came again and flew over the post and was engaged. It was shot down, and besides the pilot, we found it also had on board the opposing Brigade Commander and an SO, all of whose bodies were recovered. There was the obvious protest from Pakistan through the DGMO, and the obvious inquiries from the MoD. Since I had already informed the higher HQ of our proposed action, we were on a sound wicket within our agreement of the AGPL.

The helicopter intrusion by Pakistan had been preceded by heavy artillery fire, followed by assaulting infantry. The alertness of the post-commander and the quick retaliation by our artillery and mortar fire not only repulsed the attack, but left many of the enemy dead on the slopes. We allowed the enemy to retrieve their dead, including their Brigade Commander, once such instructions were received from HQ Northern Command and the DGMO. The Indian Army while remaining committed to the defence of the country to the last breath and to the welfare of its fighting force, is also committed to values of honour towards the foe, and this quality is something we should recognise and be proud of.

I have always maintained that a timely and firm response at all levels is a must for a fighting Force, along with proper contingency planning. Information must always be assessed, acted upon and disseminated, to everyone in the chain of command. For this, the communication equipment must be given priority; in the conditions that the Armed Forces operate at present, it is often inadequate in quality as well as quantity, and this must be an area of concern and rectification.

The units operating in the counter-insurgency operations and those guarding the LOC/AGPL in the J&K are doing an excellent job, and need to be given due appreciation and consideration. Isolated incidents of indiscipline need to be handled with maturity. The media often forgets the trying conditions the troops face and the few incidents of inadvertent damage to the civilian populace and the property are more often than not, blown out of proportion. Conversely, there is inadequate concern or empathy for the troops. There are many instances of apathy in civil society and the political leadership towards the Armed Forces, including regulations that are surprising, if not downright unreasonable. The grudging acceptance of field allowances, which we had to fight for, is another instance of such a lack of concern for the Armed Forces. 

Officials and citizens, who have never needed to live and work for sustained periods in the hazardous and trying conditions of field-areas, must make the effort to appreciate what this involves. I recall the time when we had to evacuate injured soldiers from forward areas to the airfield or to the hospitals periodically; this had to be done in the Air Force or the Army Aviation helicopters. One day I was informed that a soldier who had died in an inaccessible area was not being air-lifted, as the rules did not allow this. Despite repeated requests the pilot refused to comply. It took us considerable days to get the MOD to rewrite the rules for this sort of an eventuality. When this is how little a nation honours the sacrifices of its soldiers, it must be prepared for a situation in the near future when it may not have such brave-hearts to cherish anymore.

---

[1] An insurgent movement or insurgency is defined as a rebellion or insurrection, from Latin Insurgere, ‘rise up’; it is often a political movement with a specific aim; it need not employ tactics of terror and is not synonymous with terrorism. Wikipedia notes that there is neither an academic nor an international legal consensus for the definition of terrorism, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definitions_of_terrorism); however, the Chambers’s Twentieth Century Dictionary defines terrorism, as ‘an organized system of intimidation’; and a ‘terrorist’ is defined in the Oxford Dictionary, as ‘a person who uses violence and intimidation in an attempt to achieve political aims’.