The existing higher defence management
system of the country continues to be unresponsive and indifferent to
the needs of the armed forces and the material state of the military
and its operational state remains far from satisfactory. Our
modernisation programme suffers from inordinate delays and the goal
of self-reliance remains a distant dream. The root cause for this
state of affairs is lack of accountability of the political
leadership who enjoy all the powers and absence of the military from
the decision loop of the security related issues. The indifferent
civil -military relations and the poor institutional values are a
matter of concern. The various studies on military reforms and their
recommendations remain unimplemented. The government needs to move
quickly and take some difficult decisions to put the national
security issues on track.
Integration of the Service HQs with
the MOD is part of the approved reforms by the GOM 2001, subsequent
the Kargil Review Report ,already notified by the Government on 23
May 2002 for implementation. The intention of this reform was to
enable the SHQ to participate in the decision making and policy
implementation at all levels of governance. However, on the ground
little has changed except the nomenclature. The purpose of Higher
Defence Organisation, as we know, is to evolve a national security
strategy for near, middle and long terms perspective, after examining
threats and opportunities, thereafter enable employing the total
national power to achieve national aims . The Higher Defence
Organisation(HDO), should therefore enable the following--
(a) Formulating a Joint doctrine, long
term perspective plans for force levels, equipment procurements and
technology acquisitions.
(b) Developing medium and long term
strategy for national defence for all the spectrums of war.
(c) Providing the command structure to
enable the political leadership to exercise control over the nuclear
weapons and the strategic forces.
(d) Ensuring a close interface between
the uniformed fraternity, civil bureaucracy and the political
leadership to expedite the politico-military decision making.
2. The question we need to examine is
whether the stated objectives of the HDO are being achieved or not.
Has the integration of the SHQ as on now, made any difference? We
need to briefly examine the entire issue and the background, before
passing a judgement. The erstwhile Defence Committee of the Cabinet
(DCC) chaired by the PM, and Defence Ministers Committee chaired by
the RM, which were in vogue till late fifties used to provide an
integrated decision making and the higher defence control
Organisation (HDO). However in 1962, these established institutions
were bypassed by the PM/ RM, relying on select individuals for the
defence management and direction. Even the then JIC which was a joint
mechanism for intelligence assessment became defunct and the Director
IB became the sole advisor to the PM. In the absence of DCC, a
committee of secretaries under the Cabinet Secretary was formed to
make recommendations to the PM, which has served as the Strategic
Planning Group (SPG) till today. The Service HQ over a time were
reduced to adjuncts of the MOD, which operated as another “tier”
between the SHQ and the Minister and were also placed completely
outside the ministry, which they could approach through the medium of
files. The Armed forces feel that their administrative powers have
been steadily eroded and they had to live with a dysfunctional
system. Admiral DK Joshi, former Naval Chief, who had resigned, after a number of accidents on naval platforms, due to
sheer frustrations on his inability to get the necessary response
from the MOD for prompt repairs and essential spares. In his candid
observations, he has noted the institutional flaws in the higher
defence management system, wherein professional competence,
expertise, accountability, responsibility, and authority reside in
different spheres or compartments. While professional competence,
accountability and the responsibility is with the Service HQ, the
authority to approve or sanction or empowerment to obtain something
is with the MOD. Thus we have a situation where the service HQ have
all the responsibility without the corresponding authority, whereas
all the powers and authority rests with the MOD without any
accountability. Thus, the politicians and the civil officials enjoy
power without any accountability and the military assumes the
responsibility with out any, commitment or guidance from the
political authorities. It is obvious that the long over due reforms
,in the higher defence management, except a few peripheral ones have
not been implemented due to vested interests. The two substantive
recommendations of creating a CDS and integrating the SHQ with the
MOD have been left out ,despite the repeatedly recommended reforms by
the various committees. The Kargil Review Committee and the GOM made
substantial recommendations for reforming the National Security
system in Feb 2001. Some of the major reforms recommended were as
under--
(a) SHQ to be designated as
-”integrated HQ of the MOD'' instead of ''attached offices”, so
as to be able to participate in decision making and policy
formulation.
(b) Financial powers and
Administrative authority to be delegated to the SHQ and lower
formations to expedite decision making.
(c) As the present COSC was not found
effective, a permanent institution of a CDS was approved,which could
provide single point military advice to the Government, prioritise
the inter-service proposals, provide the joint-ness to the armed
forces in planning for operations, surveillance, maritime security
and the targeting philosophy. The CDS would also command and
administer the nuclear and the strategic forces, besides the other
unified commands.
(d) To expedite the procurement
process, a new procurement structure, with a Defence Acquisition
Council, under the RM, along with a defence procurement board, a
defence production board and a defence R&D board were to be
established under the respective secretaries, with suitable
representation from the services, along with the integrated finance.
This reform has been carried out, except that the system is being
operated by officials who are not specialists in this field and have
the same traditional attitude of fixed minds. The modernisation of
the armed forces has not been satisfactory and the decision process
continues to be slow.
3. As we are aware the GOM
recommendations have only been partially implemented and the more
substantive ones like the creation of the CDS and Integration of the
SHQ with the MOD have been left out. The recently appointed “Naresh
Chandra Committee' has also re-emphasised the military reforms,
although these have not been put in the public domain. It is
Understood that the CDS has been recommended to be modified as the
permanent COSC, in this report, which would be rotational between the
Services and the report also recommends creation of a special forces
command and the aerospace command, besides examining other aspects
pertaining to cyber warfare, indigenisation of defence equipment,
self-reliance, DRDO and the management of other defence assets.
4. So far as the integration of the SHQ
with the MOD is concerned the government had issued a notification as
early as 23May 2002 designating the SHQ as the integrated departments
of the MOD and also set up a Chief of integrated defence staff(CIDS)
with officials from the three services. This has not brought about
any real integration and is only peripheral change. The integration
with the MOD implies the basic change in the overall concept of
functioning as a team together rather then a “tier” in between
the two. It would also imply, cross- posting of defence officers to
the MOD and of the civil officials to the selected departments of the
SHQ, to evolve and implement integrated plans, after joint evaluation
to ensure speedy decision making and reduce wasteful duplication and
the delays. However, this has not happened due to mistrust, turf wars
and reasons of the cadre management. In fact, the civilian officials
who come to the MOD have no first hand knowledge or any military
experience. To overcome this the GOM 2001, had approved ,the ''Vohra
Committee'' recommendation creating a dedicated pool of trained
officers drawn from various streams, who would be permanently
seconded in the security management arena. This pool of officers
would consist of officials drawn from 'All India Services ' and the
technocrats., however this has remained in cold storage.
5 The integration of the SHQ and the
MOD, does not mean occupying each others “space” or diluting the
importance of the civil officials, but enable teamwork and joint-ness
at all levels in evolving solutions for manpower planning,
development of weapon systems, procurement of military equipment and
setting up infrastructure, logistics management and transportation as
being practised in most of the modern militaries. The integration
would entail shared responsibility and avoid duplication and wastages
even with OFB, DPSUs and the DRDO. There have been instances, which I
am aware off, where due to the lack of coordination in the MOD, the
same equipment has been purchased by the three services from the same
country at different prices i.e. “Searcher”& “Heron” UAVs
from Israel. But the problem is the reluctance of the officials of
the government to share their powers and protect the exclusive turf.
Since the Civilian officials deal directly with the politicians on a
daily basis, the politicians also feel comfortable in consulting
them, leaving the services out of the loop except in a crisis
situation. Another aspect that needs examination is the staffing of
the entire security management apparatus i.e. the NSA Sectt. IDS and
the CDS by a pool of dedicated cadre officers from the civilian
stream and the three Services, whether on a tenure basis or by an
integrated cadre. HQ IDS has had considerable experience in the joint
-ness within the three services and are ideally placed to identify
the specifics for enlarging the examination to suggesting staffing
norms for the entire security management apparatus.
6. The integration of the services with
the MOD would enable developing joint responsibility for national
security instead of engaging in blame games, as experienced during
the Kargil operations of which I have the personal experience.
Initially it was the intelligence failure with every agency blaming
the other and no institutional collective intelligence analysis,
followed by the issue of air photos and the satellite imagery. Even
the credible “leads” available were not followed up by the IB or
shared with each other except in a routine manner. In the operational
planning there was absence of agreement on the use of air power and
the enlargement of the area of operations beyond the
Kargil-Dras-Batalik sectors of the intrusion. The government was
indecisive as no institutional 'war gaming' and strategic
appreciation had been conducted in the absence of a CDS. The Army was
asked to remove the intrusion, without enlarging the area of
operations .Permission to use the Air power was approved on the 25
May good two weeks later, as there were differences in the
perceptions of the services. The institution of the CDS and an
integrated MOD would have enabled a speedier and more balanced
response. The equipment of the defence forces was not as per the
scaling as the procurement procedures were slow and cumbersome
resulting in operational voids. The country was unprepared for a
full-scale war with vital shortages in the critical ammunition and
the weapons. Frantic efforts were made by the government to obtain
the equipment and the ammunition by imports, however, most of the
contracts finalised remained in the pipeline, as there is a minimum
lead time for defence equipment as these are not available off the
shelf. One of the reforms of the Kargil war regarding establishing a
Defence Acquisition Cell and the procurement apparatus has been
implemented and has brought about integration and speedier decision
making, though there are implementation flaws in the system. The
procurement board under the Defence Secretary has technical managers
of Maj Gen rank from the three services, along with the IFA, who
operate as a team, and this is a fine example of integration of SHQ
with the MOD and could easily become the model for the rest. The DGQA
and the Directorate of standardisation are other examples of
integration, which could be tried out in the OFB, DPSUs and the DRDO
and the MOD, if there is the political will to do so. The DIA is
today staffed by the officers of only the three services, with no
representative from the IB and the RA&W, making the intelligence
gathering incomplete, although there are the interactive meetings of
all the intelligence agencies at the'' multi agency centre''. The
directorates of NCC, TA and the logistics management wings of the
services also lend for integrated functioning, rather than the
layered functioning with the MOD.
7. Lack of integration manifests in
the management of the DPSUs, and the OFB. The HAL with its nine
divisions is the biggest DPSU and is virtually sustained by the IAF
budgetary support , due to assembly and manufacture of the various
aircrafts, as its exports are less than 3% of its production. The
need for joint-ness and planning for aircraft design and development
with the IAF is obvious, yet, the MOD in its wisdom has still not
included IAF's Head of Engineering and Maintenance to the HAL Board.
The same logic applies to the Naval dockyards, the tank and the BMP
factories, the missile manufacturing plants, the EW warfare
establishments like the BDL, BEML BEL, ARDE, where service officers
as the users need to be posted. In fact the integration has to be
extended to all the wings of the Department of Defence production.
The specifics can be worked out by a study. In the UK and some other
countries, they function with the concept of forming integrated
project teams of professionals of various disciplines for development
and production of the equipment systems, as we have done for the
Brahmos missile system. In the UK the scientific laboratories are not
with the DRDO but are part of the production agencies. In France they
have the General department of Armament(GDA), directly under the
minister consisting of the professionals from various disciplines for
development, production and induction of defence equipment in the
armed forces.
8. The nuclear weapons further
highlight the need for integration between the military, and the
civil as the “delivery systems' are held and operated by the
Services and the “warheads' are held by the DRDO and the decision
making is by the government. For exercising the nuclear option many
inputs are required from the various stake holders. Similarly the
defence communications need to be integrated. There is a need to make
tangible progress in the integration of the MOD and the military in
many fields such as training, Air defence, common user items of UAVs,
helicopters and human resource management and the logistics
management. It is therefore, imperative that the Reforms recommended
by the Kargil Committee Report are dusted out and implemented fully.
