SINO-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP IN TRANSITION
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS.
India was the first non-socialist
country to recognize the Peoples Republic of China on its founding.
It supported China's efforts to join the United Nations and during
the Korean war it maintained neutrality. It proposed the famous five principles of Peaceful Coexistence with China in 1954 and
called for the spirit of Afro-Asian at Bandung in 1955. China had
very cordial relations with India in the 1950s with the mutual
exchange of visits of the two premiers till 1957. However, tensions
developed from 1959 onwards, along the borders, leading to the 1962
War. The reasons for the war are well known, and the dispute persists
even today, due to the disagreements on the validity of the Macmahan
Line, despite 17 meetings of the Joint Working Group. Finally the
relations were repaired and the two countries exchanged Ambassadors
in 1976. Mr Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988 and accelerated
restoration of cordial relations. PM Shri Narshima Rao visited China
and signed the agreement on Peace and Tranquility on the borders, in
1993. When Jiang Zemin reciprocated the visit in 1996, he signed the
Agreement on Strengthening Military trust along the Lines of Actual
Control and proposed the establishment of a constructive partnership
with India. The President of India visited China in 2000 and the
misunderstandings after India's nuclear tests of 1998 were
smoothened.Mr Atal Vihari Vajpayee made a formal visit to China on 22
June that greatly promoted the Sino- Indian relations.During his
visit the two countries issued the Declaration of Principles of
Relationship and Overall Cooperation. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao also
visited India , primarily to discuss the trade and economic
matters.The issue of stapled visa's being issued to the residents of
J & K was cleverly ducked by stating that China considers J&K
as a disputed territory. The recent visit of the Chinese President
to India has been path- breaking and historic. .All the issues were
discussed with Mr Modi in an atmosphere of great frankness and
cordiality.We reminded them that just as the Chinese are sensitive to
the issue of the Tibet so are we to our territorial integrity. China
has been aggressive on the entire 4,057 km un-demarcated borders on
land as evidenced during the recent Depsang and Chumar stand offs.
On the Indian Ocean region the PLA Navy is making more forays
ostensibily to make friendly port calls or on rest or refits
consequent to fighting the sea pirates in Somalia. The Chinese
strategy of 'String of Pearls' by creating naval facilities at
Gwadar. Hambantota, Chittagong and Sitwe has provided her ability to
make presence in the Indian Ocean or develop the so called silk-route. These developments, security access and the basing facilities
in South Asia along with the improved infra structure in Tibet
provide her a military capability that has to be taken note off
seriously , notwithstanding the increasing trade relations. The
recent visit of the Chinese President and his Discussions on all the
issues with Mr Modi, were more significant .The Chinese promise of
financial investments and infrastructure developments in India are
the positives which augur well for the future. However, there are
the following important issues which persist and need to be resolved
amicably to normalise the relations between the two countries--
(a) The unresolved border issue.
(b) Trade imbalance with India.
(c) Maritime cooperation and
Challenges.
(d) The China-Pak military and
nuclear collaboration.
The Border Issue.
2. The Sino- Indian border dispute
is the most challenging issue, divided into Eastern , Middle, and
the Western sectors. The 1914 Simla Agreement between Britain and
Tibet is not accepted by the Chinese, and thus the Macmahan line is
not recognised by them. The principle the Chinese government applied
to the Sino -Indian border dispute, were, that the boundary has never
been formally drawn but that there is a traditional boundary line;
that the two countries should maintain the status quo and avoid
escalation before they reach a solution and should be considerate and
tolerant to each other. However on the ground the situation has
already been altered by the Chinese in the Aksai Chin sector where
they built a road in 1954 and call it, as their own territory. They
also entered into a boundary agreement with Pakistan who has
illegally acceded the Shaksgham valley in the Pak occupied Kashmir to
them. In fact after the 1962 conflict with us, they unilaterally
withdrew from the territoriies occupied except in the Western sector,
where their have been periodic standoffs in the Depsang, Chumar and
Chushul areas. They have an excellent net work of roads and billets.
It is highly unlikely that they would ever vacate this region. The
Middle sector is the least contentious and lends for an early
settlement. The Eastern sector is our State of Arunachal Pradesh
which they call as the Southern Tibet.Although other than the Tawang
Monastery ,which had religious linkages with Lhasa, the Chinese are
never known to have any physical control of this region, yet they
claim this region. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Eastern
sector generally follows the water shed and approximates to the
Macmahan line. We have de facto control over this region and the
Indian government and the armed forces would defend this even if the
Chinese persist to claim this. The troops on the ground are
handicapped as in the absence of a demarcated border; and the
personnel from the two sides patrol or make forays in the area
leading to frequent protests and diplomatic interventions, to resolve
the issue as it happened even during the recent visit of the Chinese
president to India. Their have been 17 border Joint Working Group
(JWG) meetings without much headway.Although, we have also improved
our military capabilities, and can hold our ground, we are not in a
position to retake our claimed line due to the superior Chinese
military posture and better infrastructure. Military solution is, therefore, not a practical option. Ultimately it would have to be a
political solution acceptable to both the sides involving trade -off
of the territory, as a package deal which only a strong government in
the two countries can deliver, as both sides will have to make a
compromise to their stated positions. It is believed that such a plan
was even visualized between Chou-en-Lai and Nehru in the early
fifties, before the stands hardened .
The Trade Imbalance.
3. Objectively speaking, the Sino-Indian
relationship is characterized by both conflicts and the existence of
common interests such as trade and economic development for which
both need a peaceful environment. The trade with China is nearly
touching 80 billion US Dollars, however, their is a huge trade
deficit with India. The adverse trade deficit with China is more than
40% of the trade, which can not be rectified unless our exports to
China are increased. There are opportunities in the Indian
Pharmaceuticals, automobile ancillaries, textiles and IT where exports
can be increased provided the Chinese reduce tariff or provide a
level playing field, otherwise this would remain a serious problem.
The recent promise by the Chinese of investing in India in the
infrastructure sector to the tune of 30 billion dollars is a good
step in this regard and would reduce the trade imbalance.India's Look
East Policy to open up the North Eastern States and develop trade
with the neighbours and with China are other welcome developments
which should be pursued vigoursly.
Maritime Security and Challenge.
4.China has been modernising its Navy
since past two decades into a 'Blue water Navy'. Their submarine
forces have modernised with their nuclear submarines going up from 5
to 10.It has also added its first aircraft carrier into the service,
along with number of amphibious ships. The stated objective of the
Chinese modernisation is the security of its energy and trade routes
of communication through the Indian ocean. However, its attempts to
convert the South China sea , as its own territorial waters is
unacceptable and has been rightly challenged by the West and India,
as these are international waters. The development of basing
facilities in the Indian Ocean region also provides China presence
in the Indian ocean. The development of the Hambantota port in Sri
Lanka and the Gwadar in Pakistan allows China uninterrupted
utilisation as both these countries will not be able to return the
loan or the capitol invested in the development of these strategic
facilities. India with its unique peninsular shape and the island
territories dominates the Indian ocean, however ,the Indian Navy also
needs to continuously up grade its capability to retain its edge. We
also need to actively cooperate with other important navies in the
region ,such as the US, Australia and Japan to dominate the various
choke points, in the Indian ocean region that exist from the straits
of Hormuz to the Malacca Straits.
Sino-Pak Nexus.
5. China has always been interested
that Pakistan remains a strong challenge to India ,so that India is
likely to be threatened by a two -front situation. It is also
interested that Pakistan continues to retain control of the POK. This
not only ensures that its vital interests are protected in Gwadar, but
also frustrates India's access to Central Asia. In the 1965 and 1971
wars Chinese announced support to Pakistan and are treating J&K as
a disputed state. Their recent policy of issuing stapled visas to the
people of J&K residents and conducting of development activity in
the POK supports this design. A muted response by India is likely to
convey surrender of our claim over POK, The proposed economic
corridor to Gwadar would pass through POK, which implies that China
has given de facto acceptance of the Pakistan's claim on the disputed
area. India must register its strong protests against the development
activity in the POK. The other area of concern is the active
collaboration of the Chinese in the Pakistan's nuclear assistance,
which can only be countered by developing our own capability as all
attempts of international pressures have failed. Similarly our
efforts to dismantle the insurgent camps in Pakistan, which are used
to support the terrorist activity against India have failed to enlist
any support from the Chinese. We should be clear that China favours
Pakistan and take this as a factor in our strategic calculations.It
is ,therefore imperative that we develop a strong military capability
and economic potential to deter a two front war. The nuclear
deterrence and the missile development, along with the military
modernisation is a compelling need to safe guard our national
interests, while talking and promoting peaceful environment for the
economic growth.
Conclusion.
6. This is not to conclude that there
are only differences between the two countries, as we do have common
interests and values. Among the common points shared by China and
India are their similar cultural and historical traditions. Indian
Buddhism greatly influenced ancient China.Both countries have opened
up to the world and are engaged in the economic development and need
a peaceful environment. The two countries have same views on the
structure of the multi-polar world politics , on the climate change,
WTO and both call for reduction of the nuclear stock piles of
weapons. On the human rights the two countries are against the
western intervention in the internal affairs of the nations.We are
opposed to international terrorism and the sea piracy in the
international waters. It is worth noting that India has consistently
supported the one China policy and the Chinese Sovereignty in Tibet.
How ever we also demand that the Chinese should also be sensitive to
our sensitivities in the J&K and and in the Eastern sector. India
and China both need to realise that while following different
patterns of government and economic development models, the ultimate
aims are the same and we need to cooperate rather than compete. To
that extent the present policy of pursuing economic development
leaving aside the differences on the border settlement to the future
generations appears sensible and pragmatic.
Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar
PVSM, AVSM.
PVSM, AVSM.
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