 |
| As the GoC 12 Inf Div, Jaisalmer 1989, with Lt. Gen V K Sood (VCoAS) and Cdr 45 Inf Bde, Brig Pritam SIngh |
In
January 1988, after my one year course at the National Defence College (NDC), I
was appointed the Deputy Military Secretary (A) and given additional charge of
the Deputy Military Secretary (Brig) at the Army HQ. I had also been selected
for promotion to the next rank. I opted for the command of a Division in any
Field–Station so that the education of my children would not get disturbed,
since the family could move into the separated officers’ accommodation at
Delhi. In the normal course, this would have been possible without any problem,
since Field Station postings do not really occupy the top spot in the wish list
for postings.
However,
I was destined to command a Division not in a Field Station, but in the deserts
of Rajasthan. This, after the initial turbulence of putting my children in
suitable accommodation at Delhi, turned out to be a unique experience. The
command of a Division in the desert terrain was a new experience for me, as most
of my earlier service was in the mountainous and riverine terrain. Professionally,
there were many new experiences for me to learn from. Additionally, since the
area of my command included the states of Rajasthan and Gujarat, my wife and I
had the opportunity to see and imbibe the spectacular historical grandeur and varied
cultural heritage of this part of our country.
The
command of a Division is something special, as components of ‘All Arms and
Services’ are integral to this Formation. This is the first opportunity in the
Army where the Formation Commander gets to train, administer and plan the
concerted application of all arms and services in the battlefield. Our Division
had the integral Armour Regiment and the better part of the 4(1) Armoured Brigade
allotted for operations. This added greatly to my professional learning and
understanding of mechanised force and concepts of operations in the deserts,
with their vast spaces, open flanks and sand dunes as part of the terrain.
The
Division was entrusted with the operational responsibility of the Rajasthan
desert sector, which is commonly known in the military as a tactician's dream
but a logistician’s nightmare. Navigation in a terrain devoid of land-marks,
water management, and the need for detailed administrative planning, were some
of the imperatives of this region. The Division was dispersed in the peace-time
locations of Jodhpur, Jaipur, Nasirabad and Udaipur, with some units at
Jaislamer and Barmer. This large spread entailed frequent visits to these stations,
both by road and helicopter. It also involved refining our battle drills to cut
down the longer turn-round time for move and deployment to the borders, and the
administrative responsibilities of the spread-out cantonments. It took me some time
and effort to acquaint myself with the peculiarities of desert terrain, to
understand the ‘mechanics’ of mechanised warfare, and the employment of armour.
The Commander of the Armoured Brigade, co-located with us at Jodhpur, Brig ‘Maggu’
Nair, a very fine and forthright professional, was of great help in my education
and orientation in this aspect.
Driving
along the border in a cross-country mode was an interesting experience in more
ways than one. As the sifting sand-dunes deposit considerable sand on the border
pillars, the problem of navigation increases—and as we experienced, straying
across the border occurs if we are not sufficiently careful and vigilant with
the navigation drills. Once I experienced this even while travelling by a
helicopter. The pilot lost radio contact and we failed to recognise the ground
location as there was only a vast tract of desert, and no habitation in sight.
Ultimately, we did a few circuits keeping in mind our fuel availability, and
landed near a “dhani” (village) to get our bearings. During night marches, the
problem gets further compounded. At these times the compass, and a knowledge of
night navigation by stars, is of immense value. The camel patrols remain the most dependable allies in the desert not
only because of the endurance of the camel, but also its remarkable stealthy
gait and navigation skills, as it can retrace its path without guidance.
Survival in the desert is not easy and takes considerable time to acquire. I
was very impressed by the 10 Para Commando personnel in their ability to
withstand the harsh desert climate, travel long distances, and perform special
missions. One of the contributing factors in their performance was their
expertise in the local terrain as they were recruited from the adjoining areas
and were permanently stationed at Jodhpur. The present policy to shift them
around various locations has resulted in the loss of this important asset.
HQ
12 Corps, our Corps HQ, was newly raised at Jodhpur and was still in the
process of settling down during the tenure of my Command of the Division. Thus,
the Division and the 4 (1) Armoured Brigade had to share assets with the Corps till
such time as the permanent assets of 12 Corps were established. This was not the
most comfortable of situations. It is a fact that each Formation has a distinct
identity which requires some amount of independence to flourish. Being
co-located together with superior headquarters means that the potential of
generating misunderstandings is always latent, and my staff had to show
considerable maturity and generosity in dealing with the occasional
unreasonable demands emanating from above.
In
the Army, due regard to seniors is an inherent and well-accepted part of our
training. However, sometimes the Senior HQs tend to impose their authority even
in matters regarding social activities. In particular, the demands of the senior
ladies from the junior ladies in Ladies Club and Welfare Functions are often a
test of patience. This creates avoidable friction. Fortunately for us, with
some effort we had established a healthy mutual understanding with the senior
HQs under the two Corps Commanders I had the privilege to work with—initially
under the very competent and professional Lt. General Narasimhan, SC, AVSM, and
later under Lt. General Y N Sharma, AVSM, SM.
 |
| My wife, Aruna Shekhar, with the ladies of the Div |
General
Sharma was a tough, no-nonsense and professional Corps Commander, who set us an
example about personal and professional behaviour. He used to cycle to his
office on the weekly maintenance day, when all transport was under maintenance.
I also followed his example and took to using the bicycle to my office on the
maintenance day. That senior officers should do so, is a fairly rare occurrence.
Lt. General Y N Sharma also tasked me to write a ‘Desert Doctrine’ as a guide
on operational concepts, and gave me a very competent team of ‘all arms’ to
assist. He took considerable personal interest in its evolution, and we were
able to produce a document as the ‘Bible’ for desert warfare. Many years later,
it was satisfying to learn from Lt. General Panag, GoC-in-C Northern Command,
that while he was the GoC 21 Corps and was searching for material on desert
warfare, the only document he could obtain was the one produced by my team from
HQ 12 Corps.
The
kind of challenges this terrain generates, is still evident at the site of the
famous ‘Battle of Longewala’ of the 1971 Indo-Pak War. The heroic action of the
Punjab Regiment and in particular, that of Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, MVC, at
Longewala continues to inspire the Indian Army, and other visitors too.
Field-visits to the scene of the Battle still form part of the training of the
Officer-students of the Higher Command Course of the Army. The deployment at Longewala sand-dunes was
limited to one company of infantry supported by a section of mortars, and two
detachments of 106 mm RCL guns. They beat back the assault on the location by
steadfastly defending their positions and swiftly engaging the enemy, who was
also handicapped by the difficult terrain and lack of logistics support. The company defences were well prepared,
with a minefield and a field battery in support. The enemy column led by tanks
was sighted by the patrols as soon as they crossed the border. The information
was passed to the battalion HQ and through them to the IAF and the Army Air
observation flight. The IAF responded quickly to this armour threat and engaged
the advancing tank column by destroying the bulk of enemy tanks and the
vehicular column. The timely engagement of the IAF on the Pakistani tanks, are still visible on the battle field with
abandoned tell-tales of Pakistani armour. The few tanks that had closed in to the defences of Longewala were engaged
by the RCL detachments of the Punjab Regiment and destroyed.
Today,
the road network and tourist infrastructure in this region has been augmented
considerably. The oil and natural gas finds in the region have also brought
material prosperity and increased the density of this otherwise sparsely
inhabited area. In the late eighties, when I was commanding the
Division, although the quality of the roads was good, there was little infrastructure development; the population centres
were few; and the Indira Gandhi Canal was still on the drawing board. I enjoyed travelling by road, and insisted
on good maintenance standards so as to economise on vehicle-utilization. I also
discontinued the system of the follow-up vehicles that were the norm for
Commanders, although at times it meant delays in my schedule due to break-downs
and no back-ups.
While
on our road travels and frequent inspections in the Corps sector, my wife and I were able to squeeze
in some time to see some of the justly famous historical monuments and sites,
such as the Nathdwara Temple, Chittorgarh Fort, Udaipur Palace and the temples of Mount Abu.
In the neighbouring 11 Inf Div sector, my visits to the temple at the
historical site of Dwarka and the Rann of Kutch were most memorable. As the chairman
of the Sainik Schools at Alwar and Chittorgarh, I was also required to visit
and interact with the schools and their faculty. I was much impressed by the
standards. However, I was surprised to learn of the low rate of selection of
the Sainik School cadets to the NDA. Their communication skills in English were
perhaps not good enough, and may have led to them not meeting the selection
criteria. While it is true that knowledge of English is practically essential
to communicate with the larger world today, we should be cautious in not
ascribing too much importance to fluency in English. There are other criteria
such as integrity, intelligence and courage which are of more importance in a
military career than fluency in a particular language. In any case, most of the
teaching in NDA is of such a high standard that any gaps in one’s knowledge are
swiftly filled in, and any rough edges polished off.
While
serving here, I also had the honour of a visit by the Chief of Army Staff
(CoAS) Gen SF Rodrigues and the then Army Commander (later CoAS), General B C
Joshi, to my Division and the forward posts. During my visits to Jaipur, I took
the opportunity to meet Lt. General Sagat Singh, one of my predecessors in the
50 (I) Para Brigade and the illustrious Field Commander of the 4 Corps in the
1971 War, besides meeting Brig Bhavani Singh, MVC, another paratrooper and the
Maharaja of Jaipur. However, my very satisfying command of the 12 Inf Div came
to an end all too soon. Eighteen months after taking over the Command of the
Division, I moved on to HQ 15 Corps as the Chief of Staff (CoS) in June 1991.
 |
| As GoC 12 Inf Div with General Roderigues (CoAS) 1989 |
 |
| With General and Mrs.Roderigues |
 |
| Receiving General BC Joshi at Jodhpur (1990) |
No comments:
Post a Comment