ASIA PACIFIC—SECURITY CHALLENGES, CAUSES, TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

1.         Though there is no unanimity on the countries included in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR), this term is generally held to indicate the East Asian landmass, the South East Asian countries, the Australian Continent, and the Pacific Ocean and its numerous islands. Geographically, the Indian sub-continent’s position in Asia is such that it does not have the Pacific Region in its immediate vicinity, but is located on its periphery. It thus, may not be technically considered part of the APR. [1] However, owing to its historical trade and cultural links,[2] and its continuing substantial economic and maritime connections with the other nations of this region,[3] the Indian sub-continent is strategically considered an important part of the APR.[4] India’s location astride the shipping routes passing through the Indian Ocean makes it an important player over the entire region, and it certainly shares common security concerns and challenges with the APR. During my tenure as the Vice Chief of the Indian Army, I represented India at the Pacific Armies Chiefs’ Conference,[5] and recollect sharing some of these challenges.

The APR is economically the fastest growing region in the world and counts for more than one-third of the global population and more than half of the global foreign reserve. It also contains natural resources, which are of increasing importance in a consumption-economy driven world order. The region encompasses some very rich nations like Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, along with growing economies like Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore. Just north of Japan and South Korea lies oil- and gas-rich Russia, which has a dispute with Japan over the Kurile Islands.[6] The entire seaward shipping movement east to the Pacific Ocean can be controlled by the three island chains, whilst towards the Indian Ocean region (IOR), movement can be choked at the Straits of Malacca, Sundae, and Lombok. China is now an industrial power-house and the largest trading partner for most countries. Its rapid military modernization, in response to which other nations of the region are also increasing their military expenditure, is a cause of concern. The US, however, appears to be the most dominant power in the Asia-Pacific theatre in the foreseeable future.

Review of Security Challenges in the APR

2.         The Asia-Pacific Region continues to be engulfed in conventional issues of conflict and is also exposed to various non-conventional threats and challenges.[7] The region has nuclear powered states like India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, which are not yet recognised as part of the nuclear order of the NPT. Then, there are conflicts about the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, South China Sea, East China Sea and several territorial disputes including those in the Indian Sub-continent. The non-traditional threats of piracy, terrorism, climate change, energy security and resource scarcity, further undermine regional peace and stability. Additionally, both the composition and manifestation of security challenges are determined by the international power politics being played in the Asia-Pacific Region.

Historic Causes of Conflicts

3.         Many Asian nations carry a historic burden of the past with bitter memories of disputes. In East Asia, memories of the Japanese colonisation of Korea and the Sino-Japanese conflict of the 1930's and 40's continue to crop up periodically, and cause intense unease between these nations. The tensions in the Korean peninsula and the sensitive issue of Taiwanese independence too, have roots going back to the past. These and other important hot-spots in the Asia Pacific are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. However, issues in South Asia such as India’s unresolved borders with China and Pakistan, are not being examined here since these are geographically outside the APR.

4.         South and East China Sea:  Disputed claims over groups of islands, atolls, reefs in the South China Sea remain a dangerous source of potential conflict. Although China maintains that all these islands are part of its Hainan province, this claim is seriously disputed on the one hand by Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and on the other hand by Indonesia and Brunei. After the 1974 clash between China and Vietnam, the Paracel Islands[8] are under Chinese control. The Spratly Islands[9] have been occupied by various rival claimants, with Vietnam in occupation of the largest numbers. Additionally, in the East China Sea, there are periodic tensions between Japan and China over rival claims to drill for the hydrocarbons around the Senkaku/ Diaoyu[10] Island group. Controversies have erupted in the region of late, because of the decision of the Japanese Government to nationalize the islands. While both China and Taiwan made strong protests, China also sent ships and surveillance crafts to reassert its claims to waters surrounding the islands. The recent statement by the US Defence Secretary at the ASEAN Defense Ministers Conference, that “China should have respect for its neighbours”, [11] while discussing the status of disputed islands provoked a strong reaction from China.[12] Although currently, these disputes appear dormant, there is an ever present danger of inadvertent trespass or incident at sea flaring up into a conflict.[13] In April this year, there were reports of Japan sending soldiers and radar to its westernmost outpost, the 30 sq km (11 sq mile) Yonaguni island, just 150 kilometres from the Senkaku/ Diaoyu disputed islands, which Japanese Defence Minister, Itsunori Onodera, said is part of the effort ‘to strengthen surveillance over the southwestern region’.[14]

5.         Taiwan: The issue of Taiwanese independence, although, termed an internal problem, continues to be a potential flashpoint with international implications. China considers reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, as an unfinished civil war issue. The US is committed to a peaceful resolution of the status of Taiwan, and deploys maritime forces whenever there is a perceived threat or tension in the Taiwan straits.[15]

6.         North Korea: Technically, a state of war has continued to exist between North Korea, the USA and South Korea, since the ceasefire of 1954 came into being. Today, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and significant missile capability under its despotic ruler, despite its poor economy. Its unpredictable family rule and political conduct, along with its high level of militarisation in the peninsula, spells danger not only to South Korea, but to Japan and to other countries in East Asia.[16]

7.         Maritime Security:[17] Freedom of navigation at sea and Security of SLOC is vital to the nations of Asia Pacific Region (APR) for trade, access to energy markets, raw materials and exports. In the case of China, 78% of oil, and in the case of Japan and South Korea, most of their energy needs are transported through SLOC passing through maritime choke-points of South China Sea (SCS), and the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok in the South East Asia. Access to the north-eastern APR can be controlled by the three Japanese controlled Straits of Osumi, Tsushima and Tsugaru. Two major  SLOCs are: SCS to the Indian Ocean and beyond to West Asia;  and East China Sea (ECS), Sea of Japan to Pacific Ocean, USA and Canada. The disputes in the SCS and ECS have the potential to escalate into conflict situations, and disrupt the sea-borne trade to a vast area beyond the region of the immediate conflict. Any unilateral action to convert the SCS into territorial waters will have serious ramifications on freedom of navigation at sea for the international community. Thus, it is in the common interest of the entire region to ensure both security and freedom of navigation in this region. In addition, the threats of sea piracy and maritime terror have to be jointly tackled.

8.     Non Traditional Security Threats: Terrorism is a threat to the security of the region. Regional countries have adopted some measures to prevent terrorism. However, anti-state elements still continue with occasional bomb attacks. Drug trafficking, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), piracy, environmental degradation and resource scarcity including food and water, and climate change, are other challenges, which have serious consequences effecting the security environment of the region. These have to be addressed collectively by all the nations of the region. Major Powers of the region, i.e. US, China, Japan, India and ASEAN, must take the initiative to resolve these.

Towards Stability and Security - Future Trends And Implications

           

9.             Emerging Power-Play in the APR

         China-US Relations continue to be seen as the most important element shaping the power balance and security architecture of the APR. In the globalised world there is more inter-dependency, especially in economic terms. Clashes of interests amongst major powers, therefore affect the economies and the security interests of the wider region and the regional countries, which might be drawn in the competition. The Sino-US relations in the APR are both competitive and cooperative. The Chinese President, Xi Jinping’s description of this kind of relationship, is that with "no conflict and no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation".[18] The US, although facing difficulties in economic development and witnessing a consequent relative decline of its strength, is still the superpower of the world and the most dominant military power. It has substantial capability in force projection. On the other hand, China's economic rise and military modernization has been rapid, making her the biggest challenger in the region. Thus, while the US presence, along with its allies like Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore provide maritime security of the SLOC, the rebalancing of strategic posture undertaken by them has to be transparent and not seen by China as a containment policy of the US and its allies.

10.       China-Japan relationship: is another important factor for stability of the region and must be managed with balance rather than provocative nationalistic sentiments by the two. The emphasis should be on politico-economic engagement and strategic interests of the region.[19]

11.       Regional Cooperative Framework: It is felt that APR is too large and too diverse for an effective regional security system, and that there are distinct sub-regions within the region with their own security problems and differing standards of economic development. However, there are also cultural and civilisational similarities, common environmental problems, and inter-dependence for trade, commerce, water, and energy. There are also common issues of population migration, threat of terrorism, drug trafficking and poor water-management. These factors call for a regional framework which mandates mutual cooperation and restraints disagreements while dealing with each other.

It is possible to establish complementariness in the approach to intra-state security problems. The ASEAN, SCO, East Asia Summit (EAS), ANZUS, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia Pacific Rim Economic Cooperation (APEC) are good examples of regional grouping in this regard. Such multilateral institutions and groupings provide a mechanism in resolving contentious issue by bringing various stake-holders together. Thus, Declaration on Code of Conduct (CoC) of parties in South China Sea by ASEAN and China is expected to prevent conflicts in the SCS.

12. Bilateral Partnerships: The US strategic primacy in the region and its bilateral relations with Japan has ensured a measure of peace, stability and economic prosperity in the region. Its military presence in the region, such as in South Korea, has allowed East Asian countries, including China, to devote their energy to economic development, as no country felt threatened by Japan. It also enabled stability in the Korean peninsula, by keeping a despotic North Korea under restraint. Similarly the US bilateral ties with Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore have contributed to maritime security of the SLOC. However, due to its economic difficulties, the US now wants Japan and South Korea to share greater defence responsibility. In the broader context, the US strategic partnerships with China, India, Vietnam and Australia have helped to balance the strategic equations in the region.

13.       The Chinese are also practicing bilateralism, by development of close relations with its neighbours and the ASEAN countries individually; by capacity building in infrastructure projects; and through economic assistance and military cooperation. In the Indian subcontinent, it has developed close relations with India's neighbours and acquired maritime facilities in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, to additionally secure its SLOC through the Indian Ocean. India is also forging strategic partnerships and economic relations through its Look East Policy with Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Japan, and Singapore. Similarly Japan, in addition to its traditional ties with the US, is also seeking new bilateral relations with countries like Vietnam and India. These new ‘bilateral partnerships’ would help improve the security architecture of the region by confidence building measures, economic and maritime cooperation and mutual assistance in times of need, along with the existing multilateral groupings. China and India, in particular need to put to constructive use their historical mutually beneficial cultural and trade relations, and remember that even till around 1750, both these countries together accounted for some 73% of the world’s total industrial production—without the attendant ills that routinely accompany today’s industrial economy.[20]

Conclusion

13.       To re-emphasize, the US is and will remain the predominant power in the short and medium term with its significant military presence across the region. Second, China’s rise and its implications for the Asia Pacific remain daunting, given the wide gap in perceptions about its security strategies and growth. However, despite the overwhelming disparity between the US military power compared with China and any other nation across the Asia-Pacific, it may be foreseen that the US ability to influence outcomes will continue to diminish relatively. Third, the larger trend of globalization will continue to erode the power of state and make non-state actors and agencies far more influential in local decision making. Fourth, multilateral arrangements, like the ASEAN, SCO, EAS, APF, to deal with the old and new threats will play a significant influence in resolving the old disputes and the new non-traditional threats. Fifth, a resurgent Russia, along with its powerful military will continue to attach great importance to its far Eastern policy in terms of energy exports, container trade and access to export markets for its goods. Sixth, a more assertive Japan and a growing maritime power like Australia would like to be counted in the emerging power balance in the region. Finally, India’s growing economy, its significant military and its strategic location dominating the Indian Ocean, impacts the SLOC (Sea Lanes of Communication) traversing through IOR.

14.       To sum up, the Asia Pacific Region is experiencing major security re-balancing. The unsettled disputes, potential security hot-spots and lack of trust have contributed to the rising defence expenditure in the region. However, a visionary leadership and the desire for a peaceful and stable environment for economic growth, will hopefully bring countries of the region together for continued discussion and dialogue, and preclude large-scale conflict or mutual rivalry. Since freedom of navigation through international waters is of paramount concern for all the nations, security of SLOCs is most important for sustainable trade and commerce. Thus, safety of choke-points and elimination of sea-piracy should be undertaken through joint and cooperative efforts by all the major economies of the region. Development of regional cooperative frameworks for conflict resolution, and for engaging common non-traditional threats, along with bilateral economic cooperation are steps in the right direction, and should be followed seriously by all states. Simultaneously, all the states of the APR must recognise that we live in a world of finite resources, and possession of oil and mineral-rich areas is not a long-term solution for energy or economy problems. This would require a sea-change in current mainstream policy, but it is vital to a climate of long-term peace and trust in the APR, as for all other parts of the globe. The US and China, as large and influential economies need to set an example in this context, and foster economic development that is egalitarian and equitable, and does not involve a never-ending search and mastery for resource-rich areas. Such an approach along with mutual recognition of each other’s interests and concerns, and an avoidance of overt strategic ambitions, are absolutely essential for the peace and prosperity of the APR.

Bibliography and References:

Trade, Commerce and Security Challenges in the Asia Pacific Region, Ed. Maj. Gen. Y. K .Gera, Proceedings of Seminar on National Security, USI of India, Nov 2012, New Delhi; Vij Books India Pvt. Ltd, 2013.

Indian Science and Technology in the Eighteenth Century, Dharampal, Collected Writings, Vol. I., Other India Press Goa, in association with Society for Integrated Development of Himalayas (SIDH), Mussoorie, 2000; First published by Impex India 1971

SYNERGY, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi, Jan 2010.  

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia-Pacific, http://www.apcss.org/about-2/ap-countries/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_in_Asia-Pacific_by_GDP_(nominal)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands_dispute                         

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[1] The component countries included in this term often change as per context. Thus, Wikipedia’s list for Asia-Pacific, includes India along with other SAARC countries, while the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies specifically includes India. However, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012  data, the list of countries in Asia Pacific by GDP does not do so. See:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_in_Asia-Pacific_by_GDP_(nominal)

[2] REVIVING THE SILK ROAD

China's Ambassador to India, Ambassador Wei Wei calls for reviving maritime and land silk roads, April 14, 2014-04-18

http://www.security-risks.com/security-issues-south-asia/china-in-south-asia/reviving-the-silk-road-2621.html

[3] Maj. Gen. B. K. Sharma (Retd.), ‘Asia Pacific – Future Security Challenges and Opportunities’, p. 136, in  Trade, Commerce and Security Challenges, in the Asia Pacific Region, ed. Maj Gen Y.K. Gera (Retd.) USI of India, Nov 2012, New Delhi

[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia-Pacific,  http://www.apcss.org/about-2/ap-countries/

[5] Held at Singapore in September 1999

[6] The Kuril Islands also known as the Northern Territories dispute is a dispute between Japan and the Russian Federation and also some individuals of the Ainu people over sovereignty of the South Kuril Islands. The disputed islands, which were annexed by Soviet forces during the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation at the end of World War II, are currently under the Russian administration as South Kuril District of the Sakhalin Oblast  but are claimed by Japan, which refers to them as the Northern Territories or Southern Chishima , arguably being part of Hokkaidō Prefecture.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan from 1951 states that Japan must give up all claims to the Kuril islands, but it also does not recognize the Soviet Union's sovereignty over the Kuril Islands. Furthermore, Japan currently claims that at least some of the disputed islands are not a part of the Kuril Islands, and thus are not covered by the treaty. Russia maintains that the Soviet Union's sovereignty over the islands was recognized following agreements at the end of the Second World War. However, Japan has disputed this claim.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuril_Islands_dispute

[7]  Swaran Singh, ‘Deconstructing Future Security Trends', in Trade, Commerce and Security Challenges, in the Asia Pacific Region, USI of India, Nov 2012, New Delhi, pp. 79-83.

[8] The Paracel Islands, known in Chinese as the Xisha Islands literally "Western Sandy Islands") and as Hoàng Sa Archipelago in Vietnamese is a group of islands in the South China Sea whose sovereignty is disputed by the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Vietnam. Divided into two main groups, the Paracel Islands comprise the Amphitrite group in the northeast and the Crescent group in the southwest located about 70 km (43 mi) from one another. Subject to a hot and humid climate with abundant rainfall and frequent typhoons, the archipelago is surrounded by productive fishing grounds along with potential oil and gas reserves.

The islands include over 30 islets, sandbanks and reefs over a maritime area of around 15,000 square kilometres (5,800 sq mi) with less than 8 square kilometres (3.1 sq mi) of land. The archipelago is approximately equidistant from the coastlines of Vietnam and China: 180 nautical miles (330 km; 210 mi) southeast of Hainan Island, and about one-third of the way between Central Vietnam to the northern Philippines. Chinese and Vietnamese forces both occupied parts of the Paracel Islands before 1974, when the Battle of the Paracel Islands occurred, after which the former took control of the entire group. All of the islands are currently part of China's Hainan Province, which in July 2012, established Sansha City to administer the three townships under its jurisdiction. There are no permanent human residents except military personnel and fishermen. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands

[9] The Spratly Islands (Chinese name: Nansha islands, Vietnamese Name: Quần đảo Trường Sa, Filipino Name: Kapuluan ng Kalayaan) are a disputed group of more than 750 reefs, islets, atolls, cays, and islands in the South China Sea. They are one of three archipelagos of the South China Sea, which comprise more than 30,000 islands and reefs and which complicate governance and economics in that region of Southeast Asia. No native islanders inhabit the islands, which offer rich fishing grounds and may contain significant oil and natural gas reserves. Named after a British explorer, Richard Spratly (c.e.1806-1866) who sighted them in 1843, they contain less than 4 square kilometres (1.5 square miles) of land area spread over more than 425,000 square kilometres (164,000 square miles) of sea. Such small and remote islands, though with little economic value in themselves, are important in establishing international boundaries.

About 45 islands are occupied by relatively small numbers of military forces from the People's Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Brunei has also claimed an exclusive economic zone in the south-eastern part of the Spratlys, encompassing just one area of small islands on Louisa Reef. This has led to escalating tensions between numerous countries over the disputed status of the islands. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands: accessed 8.04.2014

[10] The Senkaku Islands dispute concerns a territorial dispute over a group of uninhabited islands known as the Senkaku in Japan, the Diaoyu in China, and Tiaoyutai Islands in Taiwan. Aside from a 1945-1972 period of administration by the United States, the archipelago has been controlled by Japan since 1895. The People's Republic of China (PRC) disputed the proposed US handover of authority to Japan in 1971 and has asserted its claims to the islands since then. Taiwan (Republic of China) also claims the islands. The territory is close to key shipping lanes and rich fishing grounds, and there may be oil reserves in the area.

Japan argues that it surveyed the islands in the late 19th century and found them to be land belonging to no one; subsequently, China acquiesced to Japanese sovereignty until the 1970s. The PRC and the ROC argue that documentary evidence prior to the First Sino-Japanese War indicates Chinese possession and that the territory is accordingly a Japanese seizure that should be returned, as were the rest of Imperial Japan's conquests in 1945.

Although the United States does not have an official position on these competing sovereignty claims, the islands are included within the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, meaning that a defence of the islands by Japan would require the United States to come to Japan's aid.

In September 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the disputed islands from their "private owner', prompting large-scale protests in China. As of early February 2013, the situation has been regarded as "the most serious for Sino-Japanese relations in the post-war period in terms of the risk of militarised conflict." On November 23, 2013, the PRC set up the "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone" which includes the Senkaku Islands, and announced that it would require all aircraft entering the zone to file a flight plan and submit radio frequency or transponder information.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands_dispute, accessed 8.04.2014

[11] ‘US faces Chinese ire over disputed isles’, Saibal Dasgupta in Times of India, New Delhi, Wednesday, April 9, 2014

[12] China's Defence Minister Vows No Territorial Compromise, http://www.security-risks.com/security-issues-south-asia/military/chinas-defense-minister-vows-no-territorial-compromise-2625.html

[13] 'India's Role in An Emergent Asian Region', Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash, SYNERGY, Centre For Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi, Jan 2010, pp. 4-6.

[14] ‘Japan to arm remote island, risking more China tension’, Nobuhiro Kubo, Reuters, published in Mint Lounge, April 19, 2014, p. 12

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.                                             

[17] 'Maritime Challenges In The Asia Pacific', Vice Admiral A.K. Singh, Trade, Commerce and Security Challenges, in the Asia Pacific Region, USI of India Seminar, Nov 2012, New Delhi, pp. 53-54.

[18] Chinese, U.S. defense chief vow to boost new type military ties

http://www.security-risks.com/security-issues-south-asia/military/chinese-u.s.-defense-chief-vow-to-boost-new-type-military-ties-2624.html

[19] Dr Elichi Kathera, 'The New Strategic Context', Ibid. pp 132-133

[20] Claude Alvares, p. x, ‘Making History’, in Indian Science and Technology in the Eighteenth Century, Dharampal, Collected Writings, Vol. I.

Command of ‘The Battle-Axe’ – the 12th Infantry Division

As the GoC 12 Inf Div, Jaisalmer 1989,
with Lt. Gen V K Sood (VCoAS) and Cdr 45 Inf Bde, Brig Pritam SIngh

In January 1988, after my one year course at the National Defence College (NDC), I was appointed the Deputy Military Secretary (A) and given additional charge of the Deputy Military Secretary (Brig) at the Army HQ. I had also been selected for promotion to the next rank. I opted for the command of a Division in any Field–Station so that the education of my children would not get disturbed, since the family could move into the separated officers’ accommodation at Delhi. In the normal course, this would have been possible without any problem, since Field Station postings do not really occupy the top spot in the wish list for postings.

However, I was destined to command a Division not in a Field Station, but in the deserts of Rajasthan. This, after the initial turbulence of putting my children in suitable accommodation at Delhi, turned out to be a unique experience. The command of a Division in the desert terrain was a new experience for me, as most of my earlier service was in the mountainous and riverine terrain. Professionally, there were many new experiences for me to learn from. Additionally, since the area of my command included the states of Rajasthan and Gujarat, my wife and I had the opportunity to see and imbibe the spectacular historical grandeur and varied cultural heritage of this part of our country.

The command of a Division is something special, as components of ‘All Arms and Services’ are integral to this Formation. This is the first opportunity in the Army where the Formation Commander gets to train, administer and plan the concerted application of all arms and services in the battlefield. Our Division had the integral Armour Regiment and the better part of the 4(1) Armoured Brigade allotted for operations. This added greatly to my professional learning and understanding of mechanised force and concepts of operations in the deserts, with their vast spaces, open flanks and sand dunes as part of the terrain.

The Division was entrusted with the operational responsibility of the Rajasthan desert sector, which is commonly known in the military as a tactician's dream but a logistician’s nightmare. Navigation in a terrain devoid of land-marks, water management, and the need for detailed administrative planning, were some of the imperatives of this region. The Division was dispersed in the peace-time locations of Jodhpur, Jaipur, Nasirabad and Udaipur, with some units at Jaislamer and Barmer. This large spread entailed frequent visits to these stations, both by road and helicopter. It also involved refining our battle drills to cut down the longer turn-round time for move and deployment to the borders, and the administrative responsibilities of the spread-out cantonments. It took me some time and effort to acquaint myself with the peculiarities of desert terrain, to understand the ‘mechanics’ of mechanised warfare, and the employment of armour. The Commander of the Armoured Brigade, co-located with us at Jodhpur, Brig ‘Maggu’ Nair, a very fine and forthright professional, was of great help in my education and orientation in this aspect.

Driving along the border in a cross-country mode was an interesting experience in more ways than one. As the sifting sand-dunes deposit considerable sand on the border pillars, the problem of navigation increases—and as we experienced, straying across the border occurs if we are not sufficiently careful and vigilant with the navigation drills. Once I experienced this even while travelling by a helicopter. The pilot lost radio contact and we failed to recognise the ground location as there was only a vast tract of desert, and no habitation in sight. Ultimately, we did a few circuits keeping in mind our fuel availability, and landed near a “dhani” (village) to get our bearings. During night marches, the problem gets further compounded. At these times the compass, and a knowledge of night navigation by stars, is of immense value. The camel patrols remain the most dependable allies in the desert not only because of the endurance of the camel, but also its remarkable stealthy gait and navigation skills, as it can retrace its path without guidance. Survival in the desert is not easy and takes considerable time to acquire. I was very impressed by the 10 Para Commando personnel in their ability to withstand the harsh desert climate, travel long distances, and perform special missions. One of the contributing factors in their performance was their expertise in the local terrain as they were recruited from the adjoining areas and were permanently stationed at Jodhpur. The present policy to shift them around various locations has resulted in the loss of this important asset.

HQ 12 Corps, our Corps HQ, was newly raised at Jodhpur and was still in the process of settling down during the tenure of my Command of the Division. Thus, the Division and the 4 (1) Armoured Brigade had to share assets with the Corps till such time as the permanent assets of 12 Corps were established. This was not the most comfortable of situations. It is a fact that each Formation has a distinct identity which requires some amount of independence to flourish. Being co-located together with superior headquarters means that the potential of generating misunderstandings is always latent, and my staff had to show considerable maturity and generosity in dealing with the occasional unreasonable demands emanating from above.

In the Army, due regard to seniors is an inherent and well-accepted part of our training. However, sometimes the Senior HQs tend to impose their authority even in matters regarding social activities. In particular, the demands of the senior ladies from the junior ladies in Ladies Club and Welfare Functions are often a test of patience. This creates avoidable friction. Fortunately for us, with some effort we had established a healthy mutual understanding with the senior HQs under the two Corps Commanders I had the privilege to work with—initially under the very competent and professional Lt. General Narasimhan, SC, AVSM, and later under Lt. General Y N Sharma, AVSM, SM.

My wife, Aruna Shekhar, with the ladies of the Div

General Sharma was a tough, no-nonsense and professional Corps Commander, who set us an example about personal and professional behaviour. He used to cycle to his office on the weekly maintenance day, when all transport was under maintenance. I also followed his example and took to using the bicycle to my office on the maintenance day. That senior officers should do so, is a fairly rare occurrence. Lt. General Y N Sharma also tasked me to write a ‘Desert Doctrine’ as a guide on operational concepts, and gave me a very competent team of ‘all arms’ to assist. He took considerable personal interest in its evolution, and we were able to produce a document as the ‘Bible’ for desert warfare. Many years later, it was satisfying to learn from Lt. General Panag, GoC-in-C Northern Command, that while he was the GoC 21 Corps and was searching for material on desert warfare, the only document he could obtain was the one produced by my team from HQ 12 Corps.

The kind of challenges this terrain generates, is still evident at the site of the famous ‘Battle of Longewala’ of the 1971 Indo-Pak War. The heroic action of the Punjab Regiment and in particular, that of Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, MVC, at Longewala continues to inspire the Indian Army, and other visitors too. Field-visits to the scene of the Battle still form part of the training of the Officer-students of the Higher Command Course of the Army. The deployment at Longewala sand-dunes was limited to one company of infantry supported by a section of mortars, and two detachments of 106 mm RCL guns. They beat back the assault on the location by steadfastly defending their positions and swiftly engaging the enemy, who was also handicapped by the difficult terrain and lack of logistics support. The company defences were well prepared, with a minefield and a field battery in support. The enemy column led by tanks was sighted by the patrols as soon as they crossed the border. The information was passed to the battalion HQ and through them to the IAF and the Army Air observation flight. The IAF responded quickly to this armour threat and engaged the advancing tank column by destroying the bulk of enemy tanks and the vehicular column. The timely engagement of the IAF on the Pakistani tanks, are still visible on the battle field with abandoned tell-tales of Pakistani armour. The few tanks that had closed in to the defences of Longewala were engaged by the RCL detachments of the Punjab Regiment and destroyed.

Today, the road network and tourist infrastructure in this region has been augmented considerably. The oil and natural gas finds in the region have also brought material prosperity and increased the density of this otherwise sparsely inhabited area. In the late eighties, when I was commanding the Division, although the quality of the roads was good, there was little infrastructure development; the population centres were few; and the Indira Gandhi Canal was still on the drawing board. I enjoyed travelling by road, and insisted on good maintenance standards so as to economise on vehicle-utilization. I also discontinued the system of the follow-up vehicles that were the norm for Commanders, although at times it meant delays in my schedule due to break-downs and no back-ups.

While on our road travels and frequent inspections in the Corps sector, my wife and I were able to squeeze in some time to see some of the justly famous historical monuments and sites, such as the Nathdwara Temple, Chittorgarh Fort, Udaipur Palace and the temples of Mount Abu. In the neighbouring 11 Inf Div sector, my visits to the temple at the historical site of Dwarka and the Rann of Kutch were most memorable. As the chairman of the Sainik Schools at Alwar and Chittorgarh, I was also required to visit and interact with the schools and their faculty. I was much impressed by the standards. However, I was surprised to learn of the low rate of selection of the Sainik School cadets to the NDA. Their communication skills in English were perhaps not good enough, and may have led to them not meeting the selection criteria. While it is true that knowledge of English is practically essential to communicate with the larger world today, we should be cautious in not ascribing too much importance to fluency in English. There are other criteria such as integrity, intelligence and courage which are of more importance in a military career than fluency in a particular language. In any case, most of the teaching in NDA is of such a high standard that any gaps in one’s knowledge are swiftly filled in, and any rough edges polished off.

While serving here, I also had the honour of a visit by the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) Gen SF Rodrigues and the then Army Commander (later CoAS), General B C Joshi, to my Division and the forward posts. During my visits to Jaipur, I took the opportunity to meet Lt. General Sagat Singh, one of my predecessors in the 50 (I) Para Brigade and the illustrious Field Commander of the 4 Corps in the 1971 War, besides meeting Brig Bhavani Singh, MVC, another paratrooper and the Maharaja of Jaipur. However, my very satisfying command of the 12 Inf Div came to an end all too soon. Eighteen months after taking over the Command of the Division, I moved on to HQ 15 Corps as the Chief of Staff (CoS) in June 1991.

As GoC 12 Inf Div with General Roderigues (CoAS) 1989 

With General and Mrs.Roderigues 

Receiving General BC Joshi at Jodhpur (1990)

Procurement Strategy – And Modernisation of Defence Forces

Procurement Strategy – And Modernisation of Defence Forces

Introduction

The aim of defence procurements – like all procurements – is to obtain the right quality, in the right time, and at the right price. These aims become absolutely imperative in the specific case of defence procurements, which consist of weapon systems and defence equipment for the Armed Forces. The right quality of equipment, which should be evidently superior or at least comparable to those with our adversaries, is necessary to respond effectively in war against our potential foes, to combat internal threats and to deter war. ‘Right time’ implies ‘timeliness’ of the weapon system at the frontline, as the procurement process – whether through direct purchase or indigenous production – takes a fair amount of time for identification, acquisition, induction, training and the logistics support before deployment in the field. The paramount importance of timely procurement cannot be stressed enough. If this is ignored, we shall again be faced with a Kargil-like situation where our tactical options were restricted due to lack of critical equipment. The ‘Right price’ obviously must be factored in, as high quality systems have high costs, and the defence budget has many takers. Procurements primarily based on lowest bid criteria (L1) are not workable since due importance needs to be given to quality, performance reliability, life-cycle and spares management.

The necessity of an appropriate procurement system as part of an integral defence strategy has never been as vital as it is today. There is little doubt that we need a streamlined procurement system, and an efficient production base supported by frontline Research and Development (R&D) capability, if we have to be militarily strong to deter threats to the security of the country. The paper examines the essentials of such a procurement system, primarily viewed through the experience of my long and active service in the Indian Army, and my specific expertise on the larger issues relating to planning a defence strategy that I dealt with as part of my responsibilities when I was the VCOAS. Later, during my active association with the USI for the research leading up to the publication of my book Arming the Defence Forces – Procurement and Production Policies, I was able to investigate aspects of this subject in even more detail. This paper draws on all of the above to review the status on ground and the major reforms carried out, analyse the efforts towards self-reliance and technology induction, discuss the budgetary support, and finally suggest a few recommendations for a future strategy.

Review of Current Procurement Strategy: Status on Ground[i]

The fact that India’s defence needs are largely met by imports and only thirty per cent of our total defence requirements are provided by indigenous industry suggests that our defence procurement strategy needs a re-look. Whereas countries like China, South Korea, Brazil and Israel have become arms exporters, we remain one of the biggest arms importers, despite a similar take-off time. Although we have developed a large defence infrastructure through the establishment of forty Ordnance Factories, nine Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs), and fifty-one Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Laboratories, there has been an obvious imbalance in the expectations and actual performance. The DRDO and DPSUs do have to their credit a few world-class weapon systems, for instance the Integrated Missiles Systems, EW systems and the recent Brahmos cruise missiles. However, there have been serious cost and time over-runs in the case of Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun, Weapon Locating Radar (WLR), Nag, Advance Jet Trainer (AJT) and Pinaka Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL), to name a few.

The main cause for this has been our over-reliance on direct purchases, setting-up licence production facilities and the lack of investment in technology development, besides faulty procurement policies pursued by officials who are not trained or equipped to manage the contracts. Instead of acquiring technology for the future, we generally purchase weapon systems with the current technology, which become obsolete by the time it reaches us and have to be phased out too soon. Neither have we been able to adapt the technologies by reverse engineering, or adopt the joint-production route being followed by countries such as China, Israel, South Africa, and Brazil. These countries maintain linkages with the leading arms producing countries for assured investments and technology transfer, so that arms exporters have a long-term stake and an incentive for successful transfer of technology and production facility. For instance, the Chinese were able to develop upgrades from the old Soviet designs for their F-7 aircrafts and T-60 tanks.

We need to examine the reasons for this gap between the expectations and the performance in our procurement strategy. The first handicap in our procurement apparatus is a lack of continuity. Handling of high-tech contracts is left to ad-hoc assembled teams, who are not experts in contract management. Contrary to such a system or such a lack of system, the U.K. for example, has a dedicated Procurement Executive with the Defence Minister, consisting of Integrated Project teams with experts from various disciplines, for each procurement project. They are entrusted the tasks of development, production, induction into the Service, and maintenance and upgradation of the equipment till it is phased-out. Do we have – or do we even plan to have - such an integrated policy planning staff, consisting of professional experts in our system like the one in the UK or France? The answer is a big NO. We seem to be happy with the status-quo and obtain whatever is on offer, often saddled with items which are redundant and accept liberal scales of spares of little use.

 Therefore, in our system there is diffused responsibility, a lack of accountability, and a resultant lack of trust on the officials, besides over-centralisation with the Ministry. They lack an integrated approach and are not focussed on speedy procurement. Procurement process, approvals, trials and the contract finalisation are at present cumbersome and slow, causing long delays. The role of arms agents, intermediaries and the media in the arms deals, is inevitable in such a scenario. To prevent or at least limit such a situation, we have to follow a multi-pronged strategy. First, remove the need for intermediaries by clearly defining roles, responsibilities and qualifications of the officials entrusted with procurement. Second, whenever malpractices of corrupt officials/media-persons/ arms-dealers/intermediaries, are revealed, take strict action against the guilty. Merely scuttling the deal by blacklisting of the firms and delaying the entire procurement process indefinitely, as has happened in the import of 155 mm Medium Artillery Guns and aviation helicopters, without taking any action against the faulty people and the faulty process, will not help at all. Third, while drawing the contracts, other considerations of joint ventures, technology transfers, and long term partnerships, including exports of surplus production capacity should necessarily be built-in. I recall the case of the Infantry Combat Vehicle BMP factory at Medak in 1999, where the installed capacity was not being utilised as the indigenous demands were inadequate, but the BMPs could not be exported as the export clause was not built into the contract deal. We need to, therefore, re-examine our new procurement structure and the entire procurement process which was adopted in 2001 after the Kargil Committee Report and further updated in 2005, and revised more recently in 2011.

Essential Attributes of Planning Parameters of an Appropriate Procurement Strategy:

The procurement strategy flows out from the National Security Strategy and is the function of the higher defence management organisation. It is a collaborative effort between the Raksha Mantri (RM), the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Armed Forces, the DRDO, Defence Production Agencies, Defence Secretary and the Defence Finance. Success lies in the professional management and synergy between all the stake holders. The essential parameters and the ground realities must be factored in while formulating a realistic procurement strategy, as explained below.  

1.                  The security environment today, is constantly changing and a wider range of tasks have to be performed warranting acquisition and deployment of new technology more quickly than before.

2.                  Sources of assured military supplies have dwindled. Thus, alternate sources for technology induction have to be identified by strategic partnership or through indigenous capability, and modernisation and systems upgradation have to be undertaken periodically to maintain operational readiness.

3.                  Technology denial regimes have become operative, necessitating transfer of technology (ToT) by direct purchase or joint-ventures and development of indigenous technology. R&D effort and investments in critical technology need greater focus. Self-reliance effort needs to be enhanced significantly by private sector participation and modernisation of the DPSUs.

4.                  Over optimistic claims by the DRDO, often lead to inordinate delays. To give one example, American Weapon Locating Radar (WLR) selected in 1990-91 was finally bought in 2005-6 after a failed enterprise of the DRDO. This affected the operational capability during the Kargil conflict in 1999 adversely. The DRDO needs to work more closely with the Defence Forces and DPSUs to develop or obtain relevant technology.

5.                  Financial powers remain highly centralised with the Ministry. Some liberalisation and delegation has taken place in the case of revenue expenditure; however capital purchases are stringently controlled by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). There is insufficient delegation to the users i.e. the Armed Forces, DRDO, DPSUs, DRDO, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), to develop, innovate or procure even the low technology products. It is in the purchase of capital equipment (aircraft, ships, tanks, guns and weapon systems) that the real problem arises and needs detailed examination.

6.                  Capital purchases up to 100 crores should thus be delegated to the users leaving only the big projects with the Ministry. This will enable the Services to procure urgent items and avoid situations where critical shortages, such as tank ammunition or night vision devices do not persist, as was revealed recently and debated in the media and in the Parliament. While handling equipment purchases the cardinal principles of financial management of equity, integrity, economy and efficiency, apply equally.

7.                  In our present procurement structure, we have an ad-hoc team entrusted with the responsibility of managing high-tech contracts without any permanency, continuity, accountability, and post-contract monitoring. Most high-tech contracts are high value items like aircrafts, ships, tanks and have to meet stringent specifications and performance guarantees, besides providing long-term life cycle spares backup. It is therefore extremely important that contracts are drawn out with care, stating performance parameters, installation details, Transfer of Technology (ToT) incentives for the seller, utilisation of excess capacity and the maintenance support. All this requires expertise, technical, financial and managerial competence, evaluation and monitoring, by a team of professionals.

8.                  While the money allocation for the Services has always been substantially less than their legitimate needs, there is a paradox of huge surrender of funds due to slow decision making. All sub-systems need not be produced exclusively for the defence sector; where possible they should be for dual-use, and purchased commercially off the shelf (COTS). It is cheaper to outsource spares and ancillaries to the private sector rather than manufacture the entire range of products in the Ordnance Factories. The DRDO should concentrate on the critical technologies rather than spread its wings too wide and fritter away its resources in low-tech activities. We therefore need optimum utilisation of funds and resources.

9.                  A family concept of weapons and equipment should be evolved rather than importing from diverse sources. The problem in doing so can be illustrated by the fact that Milan, Concourse, Malutka anti-tank missiles of the same generation were imported from different countries and had to be phased out together without any possibility of upgrades. Similarly, wasteful deals were concluded in purchase of drones i.e. pilot-less aircraft, of the same design at different prices by the three Services due to lack of coordination at the Ministry.

Major Policy Reforms

The new industrial policy of 1991 enabled the Indian private industry to grow and participate in defence production to some extent. After the Kargil Committee Report on 26 February 2001 highlighted the requirement of reforms in higher defence management, the Government also implemented a few institutional changes. In May 2001, the private sector was permitted to fully participate in the defence industry with 26 per cent Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).[ii] Integrated defence staff (IDS) was created for direct interaction between the MoD and the Defence Forces. However, the envisaged integration of the Service HQs with the MoD, and the essential appointment of the CDS as the coordinator for resolving inter-service priorities, have not been implemented so far.

A new acquisition set-up was created in October 2001, to make the procurements more efficient, timely and transparent. A revised Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP-2002) was introduced from 30 December 2002. This was updated again in June 2003 and July 2005, to make procurements more expeditious and competitive. DPP has again been revised twice, but the effective implementation of the policies formulated, has been lacking by the officials in the MoD and other functionaries.

New Procurement Structure  

A new high level council was constituted with the following members: Defence Acquisition Cell (DAC) with Defence Minister as its chairman, the three Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Secretary (DP&S), Secretary (DR&D) and Secretary Defence Finance. The planning process for defence procurements are under the overall guidance of this cell. HQ IDS, in consultation with the Service HQ formulates the 15 years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan and 5 years Services Capital Acquisition Plan, for approval of the DAC. However, the absence of the CDS in this structure, limits integration to mere compilation of the Services plans, as HQ IDS do not have the authority to alter the priority laid by the Service HQ. Implementation of the DACs decisions on procurement are undertaken by the Defence Procurement Board (DPB), Defence Production Board and Defence R&D Board respectively. The DAC is not able to meet regularly and depends on the IDS and the DPB for their inputs rather than giving them strategic directions and long term perspective.

The DAC met recently twice within a month when faced with criticism, but what about the follow-up action, thereafter, in the absence of a dedicated body? The acquisition wing lacks the resources or the authority to monitor the induction of equipment’s. The DPB handles all the ‘buy’ and ‘buy & make’ decisions, as also monitors all activities related to capital acquisitions of the three services based on the five years acquisition plans approved by DAC. The procedure for identification and approvals of the weapon systems to be inducted being slow, results in creating a bottleneck in the processing exercise. There is a case to make separate procurement boards for each service for speedier processing of the procurements.

A Special Secretary has been appointed for all matters concerning capital acquisitions. It has four Divisions namely: Land, Maritime, Air Force, and Systems.  Each Division has an acquisition manager, a joint secretary level officer, and technical manager, a service officer of two-star rank. The Finance Adviser (acquisition) advises the Special Secretary on all finance matters. 

Highlights of the DPP-2005 [iii]

As per the DPP-2005, the following are the key features.

Up to 30 per cent direct offsets purchase, for procurement values of over 300 crores from the Indian defence industry, has been made mandatory for the overseas defence firms making the sale. Joint Services Qualitative Requirements (JSQR) are to be formulated for the equipment common to the three Services to avoid duplication. The QRs by the Services are to be made more realistic and broad based to facilitate indigenous development and avoid single vendor situations. Open tendering has been allowed for items bought through COTS. An integrity pact clause for capital acquisitions costing more than 100 crores has been introduced to ensure fair play and for refraining to engage a broker or an arms agent (which apparently has made little difference). Importantly, CCS is authorised to override lowest bid criteria on strategic considerations to meet operational needs. However, this needs to be backed up by more realistic checks, since it is impractical to refer such cases to the CCS easily.  

Kelkar Committee on Self- Reliance in Defence Preparedness[iv]

In 2004, the Kelkar Committee was set-up to recommend changes in the acquisition process and for enabling a greater participation by the private-sector in defence production towards self-reliance in defence preparedness. The first part of the report submitted in April 2005, focuses on the review of defence procurement procedure and on integration of the users, MoD, and the industry for enhancing indigenous production; pursuing offsets policy to bring in technology and investment; exploring synergies between the private and public sectors; and promoting exports.  The majority of recommendations have been accepted by the Ministry for implementation.                  

The second part of the Report was submitted to the Ministry in November 2005, where the Committee recommended that there should be greater freedom to the PSUs and the Ordnance Factories (OFs) to form joint ventures and consortiums. This has not happened fully as an environment of faith and mutual trust has to be created by all the players, and a greater devolution of authority made to the production agencies, with focus on performance and accountability. DGOF and the DPSUs should also be permitted to export surplus capacity.

Recommendations for Technology Induction

An impetus needs to be given to the DRDO and the industry to develop futuristic and core technologies by a collaborative approach with infusion of funds, incentives, and on risk sharing basis, followed up with joint production. The academic institutions and the private industry engaged in defence-oriented technology should be provided incentives and financial support. An approach on the lines of Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the USA is recommended to be followed.

Technology Development Groups (TDG) consisting of best brains from the DRDO, academic institutions, Defence Services, and the private industry should be formed to develop identified high-tech systems till its induction in the concerned service. Each TDG should be made to concentrate on one discipline and the concerned wing of the Defence Forces should fully identify with the TDG and encourage induction of the indigenous product by according preference to it over an imported system.

The integrated approach adopted by the Indian Navy in the design, fabrication, trials, construction of naval warships and their subsequent up-gradations, is a fine example of synergy and partnership between the Navy, the dockyards and the DRDO. Restructuring and joint partnership model has made HAL a leading aircraft facility in the country for MIG, JAGUAR, the Cheetah and the ALH, but the locations of ancillary factories at Korapet, Amethi and at Lucknow on political considerations makes little sense. We need to create hubs for ancillaries close to the main factory rather than distribute them all over to satisfy political demands.

Budgetary Support

The future direction and pace of defence modernisation would largely be dictated by the availability of funds.[v] Presently the budget is at very modest level of 2.1 per cent of the GDP. This has to be seen in view of increased defence budgets of China and Pakistan (4.5 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively). Our defence budget is planned at 1.9 per cent of the projected GDP( $39 billion) for 2012-13, as against over $100 billion being spent by China. The revenue budget for housekeeping needs, takes away nearly 60 per cent or more of this allocated amount; the remainder amount for capital procurements has to be shared between fixed repayment liabilities of already contracted weapon systems and the modernisation demands of new acquisitions.

The cost of the recently concluded 126 Multi Role Combat Aircraft for the IAF is likely to be over $20 billion, and the 145 Howitzer Guns for the Army $ 650 million. Even this allocation is not fully spent due to slow decision making process or lack of accountability in decision making thus eroding our combat preparedness. During the current year a sum of Rs 3065 crores, being the unspent amount from the capital funds, was surrendered by the MoD. Enhanced funds have to be provided regularly as the weapon systems are highly expensive and procurements cannot be made in quick time, once the hostilities commence. To deter both China and Pakistan, and to maintain readiness to meet contingencies all the time, over a wide spectrum and a large physical area of operations on the land, sea and air space, the defence budget needs to be increased to 3 per cent of the GDP.

The Way Ahead

The first criterion is improving the procurement process and capability. Modern wars are fought on the technological superiority of the Armed Forces. The capability to defend the borders and provide safety and security to the country depends to a large extent on the provisioning of arms and equipment to the Armed Forces. The serious deficiencies in surveillance equipment and other weapon systems were evident during Kargil War and later in 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack. The objective of a good procurement strategy should thus be to deliver quality equipment faster, better and cheaper. Some of the steps for creating a dynamic procurement system are summarised in the succeeding paragraphs.

1.      Procedural changes and restructuring by themselves will not achieve the results, unless the decision making time is speeded and there is greater coordination between the Service HQ, the MoD, DRDO and the procurement agencies.

2.      The MoD remains the key player in the procurement process and tends to shirk accountability, as the responsibility is shared by too many agencies.  Contrastingly, the PE in the UK has officers from the three Services, the technocrats, and civilian officers to work in close coordination to plan and execute the entire procurement process.

3.      We need to create an integrated procurement agency, consisting of, Defence Forces, Scientists, management experts and the administrators to plan defence policy, budget and weapon projects, and authorise a CDS, reporting directly to the RM. The existing IDS neither have the requisite authority, expertise nor the structure to plan long term perspective. What matters finally is the will to reform and change. The new procurement structure still operates in old environment.

4.      In any set-up, the enforcing authority is the political leadership; otherwise the inter-service representatives and the civilian administrators would project only their respective viewpoints. The political leadership needs to display the will to enforce with firmness the provisions of DPP 2005 and the other recommendations of the various studies. Restructuring of DRDO, DGOF and DPSUs to integrate technology development and product manufacturing under one management is long overdue, besides modernising their functions. These institutions lack professional management and must become efficient, accountable and competitive.

5.      Technology is the basic requirement for development of high tech weapon systems. This requires joint collaboration with strategic partners to induct state of the art technology and need for encouraging exports for sustaining investments, besides larger allocation of funds for the indigenous R&D.

6.      Development of long term partnership with defence industry is essential for self-reliance. Partnership is a two way activity built on ‘trust’ and the users have to accommodate the aspirations of the industry for profits, just as the industry has to meet the stringent QRs of the Defence Forces in the manufacture of weapon systems. However, partnership must be viewed much beyond procurements and profits in a larger perspective, as a shared vision and a goal to create a self-reliant defence industrial base for the country. Defence procurement involves maintaining a judicious balance, in selecting the best equipment, at the lowest quoted prices, while promoting indigenous product and ensuring modernisation of the armed forces to combat the threats to national security.

Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) was commissioned into the 2/4 GR of the Indian Army in December 1959. He retired as the Vice Chief of the Army Staff in September 2000. He held the Field Marshal K.M. Cariappa Chair in 2003-04 at the USI and researched on procurement and production policies for the defence forces.                                          

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[i] Arming the Defence Forces, Lt. General Chandra Shekhar, Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2004, pp.123.

[ii] The Group of Ministers Report 2001

[iii] Defence Procurement Procedure 2005

[iv] Kelkar Committee Report on Self-Reliance in Defence Preparedness

[v] Times of India 17 March 2012