1. Though there is no unanimity on the
countries included in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR), this term is generally
held to indicate the East Asian landmass, the South East Asian countries, the
Australian Continent, and the Pacific Ocean and its numerous islands. Geographically,
the Indian sub-continent’s position in Asia is such that it does not have the
Pacific Region in its immediate vicinity, but is located on its periphery. It
thus, may not be technically considered part of the APR. [1]
However, owing to its historical trade and cultural links,[2]
and its continuing substantial economic and maritime connections with the other
nations of this region,[3]
the Indian sub-continent is strategically considered an important part of the
APR.[4]
India’s location astride the shipping routes passing through the Indian Ocean
makes it an important player over the entire region, and it certainly shares
common security concerns and challenges with the APR. During my tenure as the
Vice Chief of the Indian Army, I represented India at the Pacific Armies Chiefs’
Conference,[5]
and recollect sharing some of these challenges.
The
APR is economically the fastest growing region in the world and counts for more
than one-third of the global population and more than half of the global
foreign reserve. It also contains natural resources, which are of increasing
importance in a consumption-economy driven world order. The region encompasses
some very rich nations like Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, along with growing
economies like Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and
Singapore. Just north of Japan and South Korea lies oil- and gas-rich Russia,
which has a dispute with Japan over the Kurile Islands.[6]
The entire seaward shipping movement east to the Pacific Ocean can be
controlled by the three island chains, whilst towards the Indian Ocean region
(IOR), movement can be choked at the Straits of Malacca, Sundae, and Lombok.
China is now an industrial power-house and the largest trading partner for most
countries. Its rapid military modernization, in response to which other nations
of the region are also increasing their military expenditure, is a cause of
concern. The US, however, appears to be the most dominant power in the Asia-Pacific
theatre in the foreseeable future.
Review
of Security Challenges in the APR
2. The Asia-Pacific Region continues to be
engulfed in conventional issues of conflict and is also exposed to various non-conventional
threats and challenges.[7]
The region has nuclear powered states like India, Pakistan, Israel, and North
Korea, which are not yet recognised as part of the nuclear order of the NPT. Then,
there are conflicts about the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, South China Sea, East
China Sea and several territorial disputes including those in the Indian Sub-continent.
The non-traditional threats of piracy, terrorism, climate change, energy
security and resource scarcity, further undermine regional peace and stability.
Additionally, both the composition and manifestation of security challenges are
determined by the international power politics being played in the Asia-Pacific
Region.
Historic
Causes of Conflicts
3. Many Asian nations carry a historic
burden of the past with bitter memories of disputes. In East Asia, memories of
the Japanese colonisation of Korea and the Sino-Japanese conflict of the 1930's
and 40's continue to crop up periodically, and cause intense unease between
these nations. The tensions in the Korean peninsula and the sensitive issue of
Taiwanese independence too, have roots going back to the past. These and other
important hot-spots in the Asia Pacific are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.
However, issues in South Asia such as India’s unresolved borders with China and
Pakistan, are not being examined here since these are geographically outside
the APR.
4. South
and East China Sea: Disputed claims over
groups of islands, atolls, reefs in the South China Sea remain a dangerous
source of potential conflict. Although China maintains that all these islands
are part of its Hainan province, this claim is seriously disputed on the one
hand by Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and on the other hand by
Indonesia and Brunei. After the 1974 clash between China and Vietnam, the
Paracel Islands[8]
are under Chinese control. The Spratly Islands[9]
have been occupied by various rival claimants, with Vietnam in occupation of
the largest numbers. Additionally, in the East China Sea, there are periodic
tensions between Japan and China over rival claims to drill for the hydrocarbons
around the Senkaku/ Diaoyu[10]
Island group. Controversies have erupted in the region of late, because of the
decision of the Japanese Government to nationalize the islands. While both
China and Taiwan made strong protests, China also sent ships and surveillance
crafts to reassert its claims to waters surrounding the islands. The recent
statement by the US Defence Secretary at the ASEAN Defense Ministers
Conference, that “China should have respect for its neighbours”, [11]
while discussing the status of disputed islands provoked a strong reaction from
China.[12]
Although currently, these disputes appear dormant, there is an ever present
danger of inadvertent trespass or incident at sea flaring up into a conflict.[13]
In April this year, there were reports of Japan sending soldiers and radar to
its westernmost outpost, the 30 sq km (11 sq mile) Yonaguni island, just 150
kilometres from the Senkaku/ Diaoyu disputed islands, which Japanese Defence
Minister, Itsunori Onodera, said is part of the effort ‘to strengthen
surveillance over the southwestern region’.[14]
5. Taiwan:
The issue of Taiwanese independence, although, termed an internal problem,
continues to be a potential flashpoint with international implications. China
considers reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, as an unfinished civil war
issue. The US is committed to a peaceful resolution of the status of Taiwan,
and deploys maritime forces whenever there is a perceived threat or tension in
the Taiwan straits.[15]
6. North
Korea: Technically, a state of war has continued to exist between North
Korea, the USA and South Korea, since the ceasefire of 1954 came into being.
Today, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and significant missile
capability under its despotic ruler, despite its poor economy. Its
unpredictable family rule and political conduct, along with its high level of
militarisation in the peninsula, spells danger not only to South Korea, but to
Japan and to other countries in East Asia.[16]
7. Maritime
Security:[17]
Freedom of navigation at sea and Security of SLOC is vital to the nations of
Asia Pacific Region (APR) for trade, access to energy markets, raw materials
and exports. In the case of China, 78% of oil, and in the case of Japan and
South Korea, most of their energy needs are transported through SLOC passing through
maritime choke-points of South China Sea (SCS), and the Straits of Malacca,
Sunda and Lombok in the South East Asia. Access to the north-eastern APR can be
controlled by the three Japanese controlled Straits of Osumi, Tsushima and
Tsugaru. Two major SLOCs are: SCS to the
Indian Ocean and beyond to West Asia;
and East China Sea (ECS), Sea of Japan to Pacific Ocean, USA and Canada.
The disputes in the SCS and ECS have the potential to escalate into conflict
situations, and disrupt the sea-borne trade to a vast area beyond the region of
the immediate conflict. Any unilateral action to convert the SCS into
territorial waters will have serious ramifications on freedom of navigation at
sea for the international community. Thus, it is in the common interest of the
entire region to ensure both security and freedom of navigation in this region.
In addition, the threats of sea piracy and maritime terror have to be jointly
tackled.
8. Non Traditional Security Threats: Terrorism
is a threat to the security of the region. Regional countries have adopted some
measures to prevent terrorism. However, anti-state elements still continue with
occasional bomb attacks. Drug trafficking, proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD), piracy, environmental degradation and resource scarcity
including food and water, and climate change, are other challenges, which have
serious consequences effecting the security environment of the region. These
have to be addressed collectively by all the nations of the region. Major Powers
of the region, i.e. US, China, Japan, India and ASEAN, must take the initiative
to resolve these.
Towards
Stability and Security - Future Trends And Implications
9. Emerging Power-Play in the APR
China-US
Relations continue to be seen as the most important element shaping the
power balance and security architecture of the APR. In
the globalised world there is more inter-dependency, especially in economic
terms. Clashes of interests amongst major powers, therefore affect the
economies and the security interests of the wider region and the regional
countries, which might be drawn in the competition. The
Sino-US relations in the APR are both competitive and cooperative. The Chinese President, Xi Jinping’s description of this
kind of relationship, is that with "no conflict and no confrontation,
mutual respect and win-win cooperation".[18] The US, although facing
difficulties in economic development and witnessing a consequent relative
decline of its strength, is still the
superpower of the world and the most dominant military power. It has
substantial capability in force projection. On the other hand, China's economic
rise and military modernization has been rapid, making her the biggest
challenger in the region. Thus, while the US presence, along with its allies
like Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore provide maritime
security of the SLOC, the rebalancing of strategic posture undertaken by them
has to be transparent and not seen by China as a containment policy of the US
and its allies.
10. China-Japan
relationship: is another important factor for stability of the region and
must be managed with balance rather than provocative nationalistic sentiments
by the two. The emphasis should be on politico-economic engagement and strategic
interests of the region.[19]
11. Regional
Cooperative Framework: It is felt that APR is too large and too diverse for
an effective regional security system, and that there are distinct sub-regions
within the region with their own security problems and differing standards of economic
development. However, there are also cultural and civilisational similarities, common
environmental problems, and inter-dependence for trade, commerce, water, and
energy. There are also common issues of population migration, threat of terrorism,
drug trafficking and poor water-management. These factors call for a regional
framework which mandates mutual cooperation and restraints disagreements while
dealing with each other.
It is possible to
establish complementariness in the approach to intra-state security problems.
The ASEAN, SCO, East Asia Summit (EAS), ANZUS, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the
Asia Pacific Rim Economic Cooperation (APEC) are good examples of regional
grouping in this regard. Such multilateral institutions and groupings provide a
mechanism in resolving contentious issue by bringing various stake-holders
together. Thus, Declaration on Code of Conduct (CoC) of parties in South China
Sea by ASEAN and China is expected to prevent conflicts in the SCS.
12. Bilateral Partnerships: The US strategic
primacy in the region and its bilateral relations with Japan has ensured a
measure of peace, stability and economic prosperity in the region. Its military
presence in the region, such as in South Korea, has allowed East Asian
countries, including China, to devote their energy to economic development, as
no country felt threatened by Japan. It also enabled stability in the Korean
peninsula, by keeping a despotic North Korea under restraint. Similarly the US
bilateral ties with Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore have
contributed to maritime security of the SLOC. However, due to its economic
difficulties, the US now wants Japan and South Korea to share greater defence responsibility.
In the broader context, the US strategic partnerships with China, India,
Vietnam and Australia have helped to balance the strategic equations in the
region.
13. The Chinese are also practicing
bilateralism, by development of close relations with its neighbours and the ASEAN
countries individually; by capacity building in infrastructure projects; and
through economic assistance and military cooperation. In the Indian
subcontinent, it has developed close relations with India's neighbours and
acquired maritime facilities in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan,
to additionally secure its SLOC through the Indian Ocean. India is also forging
strategic partnerships and economic relations through its Look East Policy with
Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Japan, and Singapore. Similarly Japan, in
addition to its traditional ties with the US, is also seeking new bilateral
relations with countries like Vietnam and India. These new ‘bilateral
partnerships’ would help improve the security architecture of the region by
confidence building measures, economic and maritime cooperation and mutual
assistance in times of need, along with the existing multilateral groupings.
China and India, in particular need to put to constructive use their historical
mutually beneficial cultural and trade relations, and remember that even till
around 1750, both these countries together accounted for some 73% of the
world’s total industrial production—without the attendant ills that routinely
accompany today’s industrial economy.[20]
Conclusion
13. To re-emphasize, the US is and will remain the predominant power
in the short and medium term with its significant military presence across the
region. Second, China’s rise and its implications for the Asia Pacific remain
daunting, given the wide gap in perceptions about its security strategies and
growth. However, despite the overwhelming disparity between the US military
power compared with China and any other nation across the Asia-Pacific, it may
be foreseen that the US ability to influence outcomes will continue to diminish
relatively. Third, the larger trend of globalization will continue to erode the
power of state and make non-state actors and agencies far more influential in
local decision making. Fourth, multilateral arrangements, like the ASEAN, SCO,
EAS, APF, to deal with the old and new threats will play a significant
influence in resolving the old disputes and the new non-traditional threats.
Fifth, a resurgent Russia, along with its powerful military will continue to
attach great importance to its far Eastern policy in terms of energy exports,
container trade and access to export markets for its goods. Sixth, a more
assertive Japan and a growing maritime power like Australia would like to be
counted in the emerging power balance in the region. Finally, India’s growing
economy, its significant military and its strategic location dominating the
Indian Ocean, impacts the SLOC (Sea Lanes of Communication) traversing through
IOR.
14. To sum up, the Asia Pacific Region is
experiencing major security re-balancing. The unsettled disputes, potential
security hot-spots and lack of trust have contributed to the rising defence
expenditure in the region. However, a visionary leadership and the desire for a
peaceful and stable environment for economic growth, will hopefully bring
countries of the region together for continued discussion and dialogue, and
preclude large-scale conflict or mutual rivalry. Since freedom of navigation
through international waters is of paramount concern for all the nations, security
of SLOCs is most important for sustainable trade and commerce. Thus, safety of choke-points
and elimination of sea-piracy should be undertaken through joint and
cooperative efforts by all the major economies of the region. Development of
regional cooperative frameworks for conflict resolution, and for engaging
common non-traditional threats, along with bilateral economic cooperation are
steps in the right direction, and should be followed seriously by all states. Simultaneously,
all the states of the APR must
recognise that we live in a world of finite resources, and possession of oil
and mineral-rich areas is not a
long-term solution for energy or economy problems. This would require a
sea-change in current mainstream policy, but it is vital to a climate of long-term
peace and trust in the APR, as for all other parts of the globe. The US and China,
as large and influential economies need to set an example in this context, and
foster economic development that is egalitarian and equitable, and does not
involve a never-ending search and mastery for resource-rich areas. Such an
approach along with mutual recognition of each other’s interests and concerns,
and an avoidance of overt strategic ambitions, are absolutely essential for the
peace and prosperity of the APR.
Bibliography and
References:
Trade, Commerce and Security Challenges
in the Asia Pacific Region,
Ed. Maj. Gen. Y. K .Gera, Proceedings of Seminar on National Security, USI of
India, Nov 2012, New Delhi; Vij Books India Pvt. Ltd, 2013.
Indian Science and
Technology in the Eighteenth Century, Dharampal, Collected Writings, Vol. I., Other India
Press Goa, in association with Society for Integrated Development of Himalayas
(SIDH), Mussoorie, 2000; First published by Impex India 1971
SYNERGY,
Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi, Jan 2010.
[1] The
component countries included in this term often change as per context. Thus,
Wikipedia’s list for Asia-Pacific, includes India along with other SAARC
countries, while the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies specifically
includes India. However, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012 data, the list of countries in Asia Pacific
by GDP does not do so. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_in_Asia-Pacific_by_GDP_(nominal)
China's
Ambassador to India, Ambassador Wei Wei calls for reviving maritime and land
silk roads, April 14, 2014-04-18
http://www.security-risks.com/security-issues-south-asia/china-in-south-asia/reviving-the-silk-road-2621.html
[3] Maj. Gen. B. K. Sharma (Retd.), ‘Asia Pacific – Future Security
Challenges and Opportunities’, p. 136, in
Trade, Commerce and Security Challenges,
in the Asia Pacific Region, ed. Maj Gen Y.K. Gera (Retd.) USI of India, Nov 2012, New
Delhi
[6] The Kuril
Islands also known as the Northern
Territories dispute is a dispute between Japan and the
Russian Federation and also some
individuals of the Ainu people over sovereignty of the South Kuril Islands. The disputed
islands, which were annexed by Soviet forces during the Manchurian Strategic Offensive
Operation at the end of World War II, are currently under the
Russian administration as South
Kuril District of the Sakhalin Oblast but are claimed by Japan, which
refers to them as the Northern Territories or
Southern Chishima , arguably
being part of Hokkaidō Prefecture.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan from 1951 states that Japan
must give up all claims to the Kuril islands, but
it also does not recognize the Soviet Union's sovereignty over the Kuril
Islands. Furthermore, Japan currently claims that at least some of
the disputed islands are not a part of the Kuril Islands, and thus are not
covered by the treaty. Russia maintains that the Soviet
Union's sovereignty over the islands was recognized following agreements at the
end of the Second World War. However,
Japan has disputed this claim.
[7] Swaran Singh, ‘Deconstructing Future Security
Trends', in Trade, Commerce and Security
Challenges, in the Asia Pacific Region, USI of India, Nov 2012, New Delhi,
pp. 79-83.
[8] The Paracel Islands, known in Chinese as the Xisha Islands literally "Western Sandy
Islands") and as Hoàng Sa
Archipelago in Vietnamese is a group of islands in the South China Sea whose sovereignty is disputed by the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Vietnam.
Divided into two main groups, the Paracel Islands comprise the Amphitrite group
in the northeast and the Crescent group in the southwest located about
70 km (43 mi) from one another. Subject to a hot and humid climate with
abundant rainfall and frequent typhoons,
the archipelago is surrounded by productive fishing grounds along with
potential oil and gas reserves.
The
islands include over 30 islets,
sandbanks and reefs over a maritime area of around 15,000
square kilometres (5,800 sq mi) with less than 8 square kilometres
(3.1 sq mi) of land. The archipelago is approximately equidistant from the
coastlines of Vietnam and China: 180 nautical miles (330 km; 210 mi)
southeast of Hainan Island, and
about one-third of the way between Central Vietnam to the northern Philippines. Chinese and Vietnamese
forces both occupied parts of the Paracel Islands before 1974, when the Battle of the Paracel Islands occurred, after which the former took
control of the entire group. All of the islands are currently part of China's Hainan Province, which in July 2012,
established Sansha City to
administer the three townships under its jurisdiction. There are no permanent
human residents except military personnel and fishermen. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands
[9] The Spratly Islands (Chinese
name: Nansha islands, Vietnamese
Name: Quần đảo Trường Sa, Filipino Name: Kapuluan ng Kalayaan) are a
disputed group of more than 750 reefs, islets, atolls, cays, and islands in the South China Sea. They are one of three
archipelagos of the South China Sea, which comprise more than 30,000 islands
and reefs and which complicate governance and economics in that region of
Southeast Asia. No native islanders inhabit the islands, which offer rich
fishing grounds and may contain significant oil and natural gas reserves. Named
after a British explorer, Richard Spratly (c.e.1806-1866) who sighted them in
1843, they contain less than 4 square kilometres (1.5 square miles) of land
area spread over more than 425,000 square kilometres (164,000 square miles) of
sea. Such small and remote islands, though with little economic value in
themselves, are important in establishing international boundaries.
About
45 islands are occupied by relatively small numbers of military forces from the People's Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Brunei has
also claimed an exclusive
economic zone in the
south-eastern part of the Spratlys, encompassing just one area of small islands
on Louisa Reef. This has led to escalating tensions between numerous countries
over the disputed status of the islands. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands:
accessed 8.04.2014
[10] The Senkaku
Islands dispute concerns a
territorial dispute over a group of uninhabited
islands known as the Senkaku in Japan, the Diaoyu in China,
and Tiaoyutai Islands in Taiwan. Aside
from a 1945-1972 period of
administration by the United States, the archipelago has been controlled by
Japan since 1895. The People's
Republic of China (PRC) disputed
the proposed US handover of authority to Japan in 1971 and has
asserted its claims to the islands since then. Taiwan (Republic of China) also claims the
islands. The territory is close to key shipping lanes and rich fishing grounds,
and there may be oil reserves in the area.
Japan argues that it surveyed the
islands in the late 19th century and found them to be land belonging to no one;
subsequently, China acquiesced to Japanese sovereignty until the 1970s. The PRC
and the ROC argue that documentary evidence prior to the First Sino-Japanese War indicates Chinese possession and that
the territory is accordingly a Japanese seizure that should be returned, as were
the rest of Imperial Japan's
conquests in 1945.
Although the United States does
not have an official position on these competing sovereignty claims, the islands are included within the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States and Japan, meaning that a defence of the
islands by Japan would require the United States to come to Japan's aid.
In September 2012, the Japanese
government purchased three of the disputed islands from their "private
owner', prompting large-scale protests in
China. As of early February 2013, the situation has been regarded as
"the most serious for Sino-Japanese relations in the post-war period in
terms of the risk of militarised conflict." On November 23, 2013, the PRC
set up the "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone" which
includes the Senkaku Islands, and announced that it would require all aircraft
entering the zone to file a flight
plan and submit radio frequency or transponder information.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands_dispute,
accessed 8.04.2014
[11] ‘US faces Chinese ire over disputed isles’, Saibal Dasgupta in Times of India, New Delhi, Wednesday,
April 9, 2014
[12] China's Defence Minister Vows No Territorial
Compromise, http://www.security-risks.com/security-issues-south-asia/military/chinas-defense-minister-vows-no-territorial-compromise-2625.html
[13] 'India's
Role in An Emergent Asian Region', Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash, SYNERGY, Centre
For Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi, Jan 2010, pp. 4-6.
[14]
‘Japan to arm remote island, risking more China tension’, Nobuhiro Kubo,
Reuters, published in Mint Lounge,
April 19, 2014, p. 12
[17] 'Maritime Challenges
In The Asia Pacific', Vice Admiral A.K. Singh, Trade, Commerce and Security Challenges, in the Asia Pacific Region,
USI of India Seminar, Nov 2012, New Delhi, pp. 53-54.
[20]
Claude Alvares, p. x, ‘Making
History’, in Indian Science and
Technology in the Eighteenth Century, Dharampal, Collected Writings, Vol.
I.
