My Journey in the Indian Army: Command of the 50 Independent Parachute Brigade, 1985 -1986

Command of the 50 Independent Parachute Brigade

September 1985 to December 1986

I had the unique privilege of being selected in September 1985 as the commander of the Special Forces Parachute Brigade of the Indian Army, despite being a non-paratrooper at that time. Notwithstanding that, I earned my para-wings within days of assuming the command of the Brigade. 

This move was an exceptional honour. The COAS, General AS Vaidya, MVC, especially selected me while I was still commanding 120 Infantry Brigade in Rajouri-Mendhar sector, on the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. I had, in fact, done nearly two years in command and was due for a changeover to a staff or instructional assignment. Hence, the GOC of 25 Infantry Division sought clarification on this unprecedented posting. The Corps Commander of 16 Corps, Lt General K K Hazare, was informed of the special circumstances which were confidential, and which, I was told, would be explained to me in person by the Military Secretary at Army Headquarters.

I took over the 50 Independent Para Brigade on 21 September 1985 from Brigadier VK Berry, MVC. My immediate goal was to become a paratrooper as soon as possible. Since the existing rules did not permit induction as a paratrooper beyond the age of 35, whereas I was already in my mid-40s, a special waiver was obtained from the Central Air Command. I volunteered to do Para Basic Training after office hours, and completed my five mandatory jumps including the night jump by 30 September 1985 — within nine days of taking over command.

Apart from my eagerness to perform the jumps as early as possible, another compelling reason for going ahead with such speed (which I kept to myself) was the programmed visit of the RCDS — the Royal College of Defence Services, UK — scheduled on 1 October 1985. I considered it inappropriate that in my official interaction with the visiting delegation, I should be seen as a non-paratrooper in command of the Para Brigade of the Indian Army. 

Indeed, my tenure with the Para Brigade was most challenging, and was different in many ways as compared to other Brigades. The Brigade was placed directly under the Army Headquarters MOD for operations. However, for local administration it was under 1 Corps at Mathura and for all other purposes under Headquarters Central Command, Lucknow. This command and control model, although convenient for the formations concerned was not easy to operate in — with three masters with different responsibilities! 

Agra Station also had three other formations, the 509 Base Workshop, the 9 FOD, the Para Training Centre, besides the 50 Independent Para Brigade, apart from the Air Force Station commanded by a Brigadier or equivalent. The coordination of the Station functions and responsibilities was a major task, which warranted deft handling to ensure harmony and unity of purpose. It is to the credit of Brigadier SK Varma, Brigadier Limaye (Para Centre), Brigadier Ahluwalia (509 Base Workshop), and Air Commodore Bedoe that we achieved full cooperation and cordial relations while carrying out all Station functions. This was achieved with a spirit of understanding that evolved over a time.

Within the Brigade there were other challenges. To command respect, I had to become one amongst equals. Having seen many sectors and operational units, I must state that the commitment, ability to undertake independent missions, and the esprit-de-corps are decidedly of the highest in the Para Brigade Units. Para Brigade group, being the Army Headquarters Strategic Reserve, has components of all the arms and services. Besides the three Para Battalions, it consists of the Para Field Regiment, Para Field Company, and Para Brigade Signal Company. Its logistic elements consist of Para ASC Company, Ordinance Field Park (OFP) and Para Brigade Field Ambulance. All these Units are fully capable of para-borne tasks along with the full battle loads, besides the special corps tasks.

The 50 Independent Para Brigade undertakes a number of trials related to induction of parachutes, weapons induction, and high altitude drops as tasked by the Army HeadQuarters MO and WE Directorates. It also undertakes demonstration jumps at the IMA, NDA, OTA as motivational jumps, besides the operational tasks for various contingencies. The standards of fitness and readiness, thus, have to be of the highest levels. The Brigade is held in great esteem due to its professional capability and dedication. Its wonderful esprit de corps inspires one to give one’s best for all designated tasks. I volunteered to participate in various trials and induction of new parachutes and equipment, and organised special exercises to train the Brigade and the assigned likely missions with full tactical levels. I also got due appreciation for leading the Para jump at the IMA.

Para operations are all about teamwork — building up from a small team to larger ones of sub-Units, Units, and the Formation. The professionalism of the 50 Independent Para Brigade and commitment to perform with determination the assigned tasks and independent missions, is exemplary. During my tenure, we successfully converted the Brigade on the new Russian D5 parachutes for jumps from the IL 76 aircraft. We had to learn to use the new heavy drop platforms for guns and vehicles. It did not prove to be a smooth transition, as we had two fatalities due to the parachutes not deploying, and paratroopers being dropped as a free load. We later learnt that the 7.62 Barrel rifles with the long barrels, unlike the Russian AK7 rifles, used to get entangled with the ropes of the parachute. We were forced to jump only with stenguns till we had the appropriate rifles. 

As per the directions of Army Headquarters, the Brigade was tasked to undertake the Brigade Para-jump at Tilpat ranges in Faridabad. This was witnessed by the Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the Services chiefs, foreign dignitaries, and diplomats. Simultaneous drop of the Brigade in IL 76 and AN 32 with a stream of aircraft was a unique and impressive sight. I had the honour of leading the jump piloted by Group Captain Ashok Goel (later AVM) and being introduced to the Prime Minister of India. The Brigade needed to do an operational exercise with Southern Command with full tactical loads and heavy drops of weapons, essential vehicles, and participate in the exercise by securing an airhead and beachhead in Goa by a night jump. We practised at the Gwalior airbase and prepared for the eventual jump at Dabolin and Panjim in Goa.

I was very fortunate to have an excellent team with Colonel JS Mahalwar as my Deputy, Gundu Rao as the BM, and Major ShivNeon Singh as the DD, with Major Jacob as the GSO2 Air. I also had Colonel Nirbhay Sharma as the CO 2 Para, Colonel KL Sharma as CO 3 Para and Colonel Nagaraj as CO 7 Para. Colonel Patankar and HS Rana Vada were at the helm of 17 Para Field Regiment. Major Nobel Thumba Raj was OC 411 Field Company, Major Perera at Para Workshop, Major Shankar Murthy at Brigade Signal Company, Major HJ Singh at Para ASC Company. Lieutenant Colonel Dayal was in command of Para Medical Units and Field Ambulance. All the Units were very competent and were specially selected from amongst various arms and services. It is a matter of great pride for all of us that this team went on to produce two Army Commanders/ VCOAS, two PSO’s, (one of them became chairman of UPSC and governor), and two Major Generals. 

In December 1986, on my selection to undergo the course at the National Defence College at New Delhi, I relinquished command of the Brigade after a very satisfying and memorable tenure. As I look back, I can say with conviction that the traditions and camaraderie inculcated and honed in the 50 Independent Para Brigade are one of the finest in the Indian Army. I am sure they will maintain these in the years to come. 

My Journey in the Indian Army

 My Journey in the Indian Army 

I  

January 1956-December 1959

Dehradun-Delhi-Bombay-Pune-Dehradun-Badrinath

The Indian Armed Forces provide unique opportunities to serve in our country’s varied terrain, including its far-flung outposts. This is especially true for those of us who are in the infantry. Often posted to border areas and remote parts of India that are not easily accessible, we travel by various modes — even by foot. En route we meet and see a variety of people and places, including lesser and well-known monuments and historical and natural sites. And we stay in accommodation ranging from tents to barracks to bungalows to erstwhile palaces! In the process, we explore many parts of the Indian subcontinent, the existence of some of which is not even known to most people. Of course, as one grows in the profession and attains higher ranks with increased span of command-responsibilities, the area of travel also increases.

I have been fortunate that I have been able to travel and live across the length and breadth of the country — from the mighty Himalayas and the foothills to the southernmost part of India, from river valleys to coastal areas; from the Thar desert to the Deccan; from the Western and Eastern Ghats to the Vindhyas and the Nilgiris; and of course, to most of the more accessible places in the hinterland. In fact, there are probably just a couple of states and union territories in India that I have not stayed in or travelled to.  

My journey in the Indian Army literally began in January 1956, when I first went to the National Defence Academy (NDA) Khadakvasla, from Dehradun. 

That was by train and I was fifteen years old. On earlier occasions, I had travelled to places as far as Bangalore with my father, who was also in the Army, but this was my first independent journey. Fortunately, there were a couple of other cadets from Dehradun — MMP Kala and Surinder Dania — heading for the same destination, whose families were known to my father. So, we travelled together. Both of them, coincidentally, along with me were assigned George Squadron in NDA. Our NDA numbers were 2355 (self), 2356 MMP Kala, and 2359 (SK Dania). I was allotted the senior most number, and that implied I became the course senior of 15 Course George Squadron. I had to take charge whenever the course assembled, and report to the Officer-in-charge. Not being used to military ways, I had to learn the same in double-quick time.

Of my impressions of the first journey, to NDA I particularly remember the flurried transit at Delhi Junction and negotiating the change to the connecting special NDA train assigned for travel to Pune, with the steel trunk and the ubiquitous ‘hold-all’ that was an indispensable part of much of our early train-travels. It was not easy to carry these bulky belongings but we managed to get hold of a coolie and a cart, which we piled high and rushed to the platform where the NDA train was docked — and managed to catch it in the nick of time! Once we had boarded it and were allotted our specific seats, we did not have to worry about any logistical or other arrangements. The train was also provided with a Dining-carriage for meals.

During the NDA training — which was a balanced mix of academic and military subjects, in addition to sports — I did the Khadakvasla-Dehradun trip often, apart from study trips to other places. The compulsory sports in NDA were novice boxing, riding and swimming, but one could participate in a number of other sports such as football, hockey, basketball, squash, tennis or cricket. The day began with Physical Training, and we were constantly on the move — everything was organised like clockwork and had to be done on the double, or on cycles moving in formation.

In later trips home, we generally opted to take the direct train from Dehradun to Bombay, rather than changing at Delhi. It was a very slow train, on the Central Line. It terminated at VT in Bombay. From there, we had to change to the Western Line for the connecting NDA train to Pune, which left from Dadar station. Though we passed through Bombay every six months on our term break, basically all we saw of the city at that time were these stations and the routes to and from them. And whenever there was an opportunity, we made a beeline for the hotel Shere-Punjab for a meal of hot naan and butter-chicken!

After three years of NDA, in January 1959 I went to the Indian Military Academy (IMA), coincidentally in my home-town of Dehradun. The IMA provided us facilities for organised treks during the term break, and we went trekking in the Himalayas whenever the opportunity allowed. I recall vividly our first trek in the Garhwal Himalayas to the Badrinath Temple, Valley of Flowers, Hemkund Sahib, and Mana Valley. Those days there was no bus or even a road beyond Joshimath, so we — Gentlemen Cadets Khan, Aggarwal, Vinod and I — walked from there to a place called Gobind Ghat on the Bhagirathi, about 14 kilometres away. We spent the night at the Gurudwara in Gobind Ghat on the banks of the Alaknanada river, which provided us with a free bed and prasad — there were hardly any wayside hotels then. This became the forerunner for many such treks later, when there was a real sense of discovery and adventure in walking in these remote areas.

From this serene and peaceful Gurudwara, we went on to the Sarovar and Gurudwara at Hemkund Sahib, which are at an altitude of approximately 12500 feet; and then to the Badrinath Shrine. At Badrinath, we were able to have darshan of Badri Vishal, and after a quick bath at the hot springs and a brief halt, we proceeded to Mana village — the last inhabited village on our side of the Indo-China border — which we reached before sunset. The heights above are the origin of Vasundhara Falls and the Bhagirathi River. The tribal population of Mana village, besides limited cultivation, rear goats and sheep and make indigenous handicrafts. They only stay here during the summers, which is the time we were there. During the winters, since it is too cold in Mana, they migrate to lower heights. On our return from Mana, we rested in a dharamshala for the night before continuing back to the IMA.

On passing out of IMA on 13 December 1959 at the end of our training, I opted to join the Gorkha Rifles. However, despite the assurance by the sponsor officer, Capt Bharat Singh, a fine gentleman from Jodhpur, that I would be granted my choice, the pre-commission recommendation for me by my Battalion Commander, Lt Col AS Judja — who was from the artillery — was for the Corps of Artillery. This caused me a bit of panic, since I had set my heart on joining the Gorkhas. I rushed to inform Captain Bharat Singh of the development, but he assured me that he had already spoken to Lt Gen Moti Sagar, the Colonel of the Gorkha Regiment. When playing in the IMA 11 in an exhibition hockey match, Lt Gen Moti Sagar, during the introduction to the players, gave me the good news that I was to be commissioned in the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles.

Those days, there was no prior attachment with the Regimental Training Centre, and we went straight to our respective battalions. However, I was in Dehradun on some preparatory leave, and coincidentally in our neighbourhood in Race Course Colony, there was an illustrious World War II veteran of 2/4 GR, Major Sohan Lal Rajput. Major Rajput had joined in the ranks and accompanied the battalion to NWFP; and later to West Asia, North Africa and Italy. In 1947, he was granted a commissioned rank as the SM (OL) of the battalion. He retired in 1959.

An institution in himself, highly popular and respected by all, and an encyclopaedia on the battalion, he briefed me about our paltan and its routine in its present location in the cold regions of Kargil — a place I had not even heard of. He also told me how I should kit myself to prepare for the winter snow, and report to the Transit Camp at Pathankot Railway Station. Some of this was already known to me from the letter of welcome from the battalion, and from (then) Captain Bharat Singh, 2/4 GR who was posted at the IMA and was my mentor and sponsor. Captain Bharat Singh had recommended that I read Bugles and the Tiger by John Masters, an officer of the 4 GR and subsequently a celebrated author. John Masters took over the Chindit Brigade in Burma, from then Brigadier WDA Lentaigne, another former 4 GR officer. Brigadier Lentaigne opted to continue with the Indian Army after the partition. Later as Lt General, he became Commandant of the Defence Services Staff College. 

The presence of the 4 GR continues till today in the form of two residential blocks in IMA named after two 4 GR Commandants of the IMA — Brigadier Collins and Brigadier Kingsley. In fact, I spent my one year at the IMA in the Kingsley Block. Coincidentally, 4 GR was raised as the Extra Gorkha Regiment in 1857 at Pithoragarh, which incidentally is the district my family hails from, in the mountainous Kumaon region. Later, in 1861, it was renamed the 4th Gorkha Regiment, earning the title of the 4th Prince of Wales’ Own Gorkha Rifles in 1924. Eventually, after independence it became the 4th Gorkha Rifles. In 1866, the 4th Gorkha Rifles’ Centre was located at Bakloh in the state of Himachal Pradesh. And my own battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles, was also raised at Bakloh in 1866. 

Our regimental history is in the highest tradition of a fighting force. In the late 19th century, the Regiment was employed in the North West Frontier; then in Burma in 1870, and thereafter in the 2nd Afghan war of 1878; and with expeditionary force, sent to China in 1900 in response to the Boxer Rebellion. The 4th Gorkhas was deployed to the Western Front in late 1914, fighting in many of the early battles before being re-deployed in Mesopotamia in early 1916. While the 1st Battalion earned battle honours at Neuve Chappelle in France in 1914, the 2nd Battalion earned battle-honour ‘Baghdad’, fighting at Tigris 1916 and Kat-al-Amara 1917. The battalion celebrates 11 March as Regimental Day, the day it entered Baghdad. The battalion also saw action during the Second World War. It was deployed in North Africa (1940-3), and fought Rommel’s Africa Corps. It was captured by Rommel’s forces but was re-raised from the remnants and escapees and later took part in the Italian Campaign from 1943-5. 

In May 1948, the 2nd Battalion was inducted in Tragbal, in the Kashmir Valley as part of the Sri Division commanded by Maj General KS Thimayya, and tasked to recapture the complete Gurais valley along with 1 Grenadiers. The battalion fought with utmost grit and courage, and played an important role in clearing Gurais-Kanzalwan sector in 1948-9 under Lt Col AW Desai. It mostly fought battles at sub-unit level. Lt Kam Dal Gurung, Lt Daman Singh Pun MC, Sub Rudra Bahadur Pun VrC, Naik Kalicharan Gurung, L Naik Lal Bahadur and Rana were awarded with VrC for gallantry. Beside five VrCs, the battalion also earned Battle-Honour Gurais, one Ashok Chakra, and “Mention in Despatches”after independence — a truly remarkable achievement. Therefore, it was a unique privilege and honour for me to have joined such an illustrious battalion at the age of nineteen, as a Second Lieutenant. And I looked forward with a sense of enthusiasm and great expectation to joining it in Kargil, far in the north of India.

THE UNKNOWN KHAN

                               THE UNKNOWN KHAN

 Jack Weatherford’s extremely revealing research and his lively analysis, in his well acclaimed book- Genghis Khan

And The Making of the Modern World, explains the startling and true history of an extraordinary man from a remote corner of the world, who created an empire that led the world into the modern age.

               The Mongol Army led by Genghis Khan subjugated more lands and people than the Romans did in four hundred years. Or famous warriors such as Alexander, Napoleon or the Axis Forces during the 2nd World War could ever do. The Mongol empire in later years expanded from Central Europe and Russia, across the Gobi desert to China, Korea, Vietnam, Burma and to the Central Asian lands, Turkey, Persia and across the Afghan mountains to India. In conquest after conquest, the Mongol Army transformed warfare into an international affair, fighting over multiple fronts stretching across thousands of miles. Genghis Khan's innovative techniques made the tactics of the heavily armoured Knights of medieval Europe obsolete, in contrast with their disciplined Cavalry moving with speed and surprise on the battle field. There are many things to learn from Gengis Khan's life and tactics.

1. The Mongol also perfected the 'seize warfare' to such an extent that it ended the era of walled cities, by choking their maintenance and making good use of gun powder and explosive shells to make a breach. He even resorted to diverting rivers and flooding the cities to make them capitulate. His forces sustained on the loot and captured supplies, rather than taking a long tail of supply caravans. He selected his leaders carefully, and appointed to higher positions only those who were loyal, fearless and tough. He thus revolutionised warfare in most ways to achieve many conquests and build his vast empire. In fact, during the Second World War the Germans found the most effective application of Blitzkrieg by the tank columns, by following the highly mobile Cavalry of the Mongols that raced across the landscape.

2.      In every country the Mongols conquered, they promoted the local leadership, craftsmen and talent to administer and govern the captured territories. They brought an unprecedented rise in trade, commerce and communications. The Mongol adopted the Chinese use of gunpowder, paper currency, art of printing and drafted in artisans and craftsmen from Persia. Vastly more progressive than the Europeans or the Asian counterparts, they developed the concept of trading routes and transit-centres through Central Asia to Europe, as they themselves depended on trade. The Mongols decentralised power and granted religious freedom in the countries they conquered (a total of 30 countries) to pursue their respective religion and smashed the system of aristocratic privileges. Christianity, Islam and Buddhism all prospered equally.

3.      The Mongols were outnumbered by 1000 to one in population ratio in the countries they ruled, yet they successfully ruled over a vast empire for generations by ingenious techniques of winning the loyalty of the local populace and yet retaining a strong punitive force to retaliate if needed. The great Mongol empire starting with Genghis Khan (1206 to 1227) who died at 60, was thereafter expanded by his four sons and ultimately consolidated by his grand sons, prominent amongst those was Khubilai Khan, who ruled the East Empire from Korea, China, Tibet, Vietnam and Burma. He even adopted the Chinese ways and the name Zhe Yuan to be easily acceptable to the Chinese people. 

Persia and Iraq were ruled by another grandson named Ilkhante. European and Russian territories were with Jochi and later with Batu Khan. The Mongol empire in Central Asia was under Chagtai, followed by Taimur. However, as all empires decline over a time, so did the Mongol. The collapse came in Persia in 1335 and in China in 1362. While Korea, Russia and China returned to the native dynasties, the Turks and Persians took over the Arab domination. The Mongols continued their rule under Taimur, a distant relative till the 14^th century in Central Asia. In India the empire came later and lasted much longer, where Babar founded the Moghul dynasty in 1519 and the dynasty continued to rule effectively till 1608 under Akbar. Just as the Mongols made China the most productive manufacturing and trading hub, the Moghuls made India the world's greatest manufacturing and trading centre.

4. The Mongols not only succeeded in building a unified Chinese state, but also unified the Korean peninsula and forged new states of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. Prior to the Mongol era these countries were decisively Indian in culture and followed Hindu religious practices and mythology. The Mongols and the Chinese immigrants they brought created a new hybrid culture which came to be known as Indo-Chinese.

5.     In contrast to the former naval powers such as Rome and Athens, whose Navies had operated in small confined areas of the Mediterranean Sea, the Mongols developed a significant naval armada and made China into a significant oceanic power, although the Mongol sea assault on Japan and Java did not succeed. These defeats marked the Eastern limits of the Mongol Empire just as the defeats in Egypt and Poland marked the empire's North Western borders. Within these geographical extremities between 1242 to 1293, although the initial conquests were subjected to much devastation, the following century enjoyed unprecedented political peace and stability with commercial, technological and intellectual prosperity. Mongols allowed full religious freedom and all religions prospered in a truly secular manner, including Islam, Buddhism and Christianity.

 History has been unfair to the great Genghis Khan by depicting him as a barbaric robber and cruel ruler, and ignoring his many contributions in multiple fields that laid the foundations of the present modern world. In fact, Nehru described him as the greatest military genius - far above Alexander and Caesar. Most western historians had deliberately attacked him and thoroughly discredited the of memory Genghis Khan and his role in history, although they benefited the most by utilizing the innovations of agriculture ,commerce, paper currency, the printing process, military technology and concepts. This book is a fascinating read, and one which helps to set the record straight.

Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar

11 March 2019.

REFORMS IN INDIA'S HIGHER DEFENCE MANAGEMENT

                       

The existing higher defence management system of the country continues to be unresponsive and indifferent to the needs of the armed forces and the material state of the military and its operational state remains far from satisfactory. Our modernisation programme suffers from inordinate delays and the goal of self-reliance remains a distant dream. The root cause for this state of affairs is lack of accountability of the political leadership who enjoy all the powers and absence of the military from the decision loop of the security related issues. The indifferent civil -military relations and the poor institutional values are a matter of concern. The various studies on military reforms and their recommendations remain unimplemented. The government needs to move quickly and take some difficult decisions to put the national security issues on track.

Integration of the Service HQs with the MOD is part of the approved reforms by the GOM 2001, subsequent the Kargil Review Report ,already notified by the Government on 23 May 2002 for implementation. The intention of this reform was to enable the SHQ to participate in the decision making and policy implementation at all levels of governance. However, on the ground little has changed except the nomenclature. The purpose of Higher Defence Organisation, as we know, is to evolve a national security strategy for near, middle and long terms perspective, after examining threats and opportunities, thereafter enable employing the total national power to achieve national aims . The Higher Defence Organisation(HDO), should therefore enable the following--

(a) Formulating a Joint doctrine, long term perspective plans for force levels, equipment procurements and technology acquisitions.

(b) Developing medium and long term strategy for national defence for all the spectrums of war.

(c) Providing the command structure to enable the political leadership to exercise control over the nuclear weapons and the strategic forces.

(d) Ensuring a close interface between the uniformed fraternity, civil bureaucracy and the political leadership to expedite the politico-military decision making.

2. The question we need to examine is whether the stated objectives of the HDO are being achieved or not. Has the integration of the SHQ as on now, made any difference? We need to briefly examine the entire issue and the background, before passing a judgement. The erstwhile Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) chaired by the PM, and Defence Ministers Committee chaired by the RM, which were in vogue till late fifties used to provide an integrated decision making and the higher defence control Organisation (HDO). However in 1962, these established institutions were bypassed by the PM/ RM, relying on select individuals for the defence management and direction. Even the then JIC which was a joint mechanism for intelligence assessment became defunct and the Director IB became the sole advisor to the PM. In the absence of DCC, a committee of secretaries under the Cabinet Secretary was formed to make recommendations to the PM, which has served as the Strategic Planning Group (SPG) till today. The Service HQ over a time were reduced to adjuncts of the MOD, which operated as another “tier” between the SHQ and the Minister and were also placed completely outside the ministry, which they could approach through the medium of files. The Armed forces feel that their administrative powers have been steadily eroded and they had to live with a dysfunctional system. Admiral DK Joshi, former Naval Chief, who had resigned, after a number of accidents on naval platforms, due to sheer frustrations on his inability to get the necessary response from the MOD for prompt repairs and essential spares. In his candid observations, he has noted the institutional flaws in the higher defence management system, wherein professional competence, expertise, accountability, responsibility, and authority reside in different spheres or compartments. While professional competence, accountability and the responsibility is with the Service HQ, the authority to approve or sanction or empowerment to obtain something is with the MOD. Thus we have a situation where the service HQ have all the responsibility without the corresponding authority, whereas all the powers and authority rests with the MOD without any accountability. Thus, the politicians and the civil officials enjoy power without any accountability and the military assumes the responsibility with out any, commitment or guidance from the political authorities. It is obvious that the long over due reforms ,in the higher defence management, except a few peripheral ones have not been implemented due to vested interests. The two substantive recommendations of creating a CDS and integrating the SHQ with the MOD have been left out ,despite the repeatedly recommended reforms by the various committees. The Kargil Review Committee and the GOM made substantial recommendations for reforming the National Security system in Feb 2001. Some of the major reforms recommended were as under--

(a) SHQ to be designated as -”integrated HQ of the MOD'' instead of ''attached offices”, so as to be able to participate in decision making and policy formulation.

(b) Financial powers and Administrative authority to be delegated to the SHQ and lower formations to expedite decision making.

(c) As the present COSC was not found effective, a permanent institution of a CDS was approved,which could provide single point military advice to the Government, prioritise the inter-service proposals, provide the joint-ness to the armed forces in planning for operations, surveillance, maritime security and the targeting philosophy. The CDS would also command and administer the nuclear and the strategic forces, besides the other unified commands.

(d) To expedite the procurement process, a new procurement structure, with a Defence Acquisition Council, under the RM, along with a defence procurement board, a defence production board and a defence R&D board were to be established under the respective secretaries, with suitable representation from the services, along with the integrated finance. This reform has been carried out, except that the system is being operated by officials who are not specialists in this field and have the same traditional attitude of fixed minds. The modernisation of the armed forces has not been satisfactory and the decision process continues to be slow.

3. As we are aware the GOM recommendations have only been partially implemented and the more substantive ones like the creation of the CDS and Integration of the SHQ with the MOD have been left out. The recently appointed “Naresh Chandra Committee' has also re-emphasised the military reforms, although these have not been put in the public domain. It is Understood that the CDS has been recommended to be modified as the permanent COSC, in this report, which would be rotational between the Services and the report also recommends creation of a special forces command and the aerospace command, besides examining other aspects pertaining to cyber warfare, indigenisation of defence equipment, self-reliance, DRDO and the management of other defence assets.

4. So far as the integration of the SHQ with the MOD is concerned the government had issued a notification as early as 23May 2002 designating the SHQ as the integrated departments of the MOD and also set up a Chief of integrated defence staff(CIDS) with officials from the three services. This has not brought about any real integration and is only peripheral change. The integration with the MOD implies the basic change in the overall concept of functioning as a team together rather then a “tier” in between the two. It would also imply, cross- posting of defence officers to the MOD and of the civil officials to the selected departments of the SHQ, to evolve and implement integrated plans, after joint evaluation to ensure speedy decision making and reduce wasteful duplication and the delays. However, this has not happened due to mistrust, turf wars and reasons of the cadre management. In fact, the civilian officials who come to the MOD have no first hand knowledge or any military experience. To overcome this the GOM 2001, had approved ,the ''Vohra Committee'' recommendation creating a dedicated pool of trained officers drawn from various streams, who would be permanently seconded in the security management arena. This pool of officers would consist of officials drawn from 'All India Services ' and the technocrats., however this has remained in cold storage.

5 The integration of the SHQ and the MOD, does not mean occupying each others “space” or diluting the importance of the civil officials, but enable teamwork and joint-ness at all levels in evolving solutions for manpower planning, development of weapon systems, procurement of military equipment and setting up infrastructure, logistics management and transportation as being practised in most of the modern militaries. The integration would entail shared responsibility and avoid duplication and wastages even with OFB, DPSUs and the DRDO. There have been instances, which I am aware off, where due to the lack of coordination in the MOD, the same equipment has been purchased by the three services from the same country at different prices i.e. “Searcher”& “Heron” UAVs from Israel. But the problem is the reluctance of the officials of the government to share their powers and protect the exclusive turf. Since the Civilian officials deal directly with the politicians on a daily basis, the politicians also feel comfortable in consulting them, leaving the services out of the loop except in a crisis situation. Another aspect that needs examination is the staffing of the entire security management apparatus i.e. the NSA Sectt. IDS and the CDS by a pool of dedicated cadre officers from the civilian stream and the three Services, whether on a tenure basis or by an integrated cadre. HQ IDS has had considerable experience in the joint -ness within the three services and are ideally placed to identify the specifics for enlarging the examination to suggesting staffing norms for the entire security management apparatus.

6. The integration of the services with the MOD would enable developing joint responsibility for national security instead of engaging in blame games, as experienced during the Kargil operations of which I have the personal experience. Initially it was the intelligence failure with every agency blaming the other and no institutional collective intelligence analysis, followed by the issue of air photos and the satellite imagery. Even the credible “leads” available were not followed up by the IB or shared with each other except in a routine manner. In the operational planning there was absence of agreement on the use of air power and the enlargement of the area of operations beyond the Kargil-Dras-Batalik sectors of the intrusion. The government was indecisive as no institutional 'war gaming' and strategic appreciation had been conducted in the absence of a CDS. The Army was asked to remove the intrusion, without enlarging the area of operations .Permission to use the Air power was approved on the 25 May good two weeks later, as there were differences in the perceptions of the services. The institution of the CDS and an integrated MOD would have enabled a speedier and more balanced response. The equipment of the defence forces was not as per the scaling as the procurement procedures were slow and cumbersome resulting in operational voids. The country was unprepared for a full-scale war with vital shortages in the critical ammunition and the weapons. Frantic efforts were made by the government to obtain the equipment and the ammunition by imports, however, most of the contracts finalised remained in the pipeline, as there is a minimum lead time for defence equipment as these are not available off the shelf. One of the reforms of the Kargil war regarding establishing a Defence Acquisition Cell and the procurement apparatus has been implemented and has brought about integration and speedier decision making, though there are implementation flaws in the system. The procurement board under the Defence Secretary has technical managers of Maj Gen rank from the three services, along with the IFA, who operate as a team, and this is a fine example of integration of SHQ with the MOD and could easily become the model for the rest. The DGQA and the Directorate of standardisation are other examples of integration, which could be tried out in the OFB, DPSUs and the DRDO and the MOD, if there is the political will to do so. The DIA is today staffed by the officers of only the three services, with no representative from the IB and the RA&W, making the intelligence gathering incomplete, although there are the interactive meetings of all the intelligence agencies at the'' multi agency centre''. The directorates of NCC, TA and the logistics management wings of the services also lend for integrated functioning, rather than the layered functioning with the MOD.

7. Lack of integration manifests in the management of the DPSUs, and the OFB. The HAL with its nine divisions is the biggest DPSU and is virtually sustained by the IAF budgetary support , due to assembly and manufacture of the various aircrafts, as its exports are less than 3% of its production. The need for joint-ness and planning for aircraft design and development with the IAF is obvious, yet, the MOD in its wisdom has still not included IAF's Head of Engineering and Maintenance to the HAL Board. The same logic applies to the Naval dockyards, the tank and the BMP factories, the missile manufacturing plants, the EW warfare establishments like the BDL, BEML BEL, ARDE, where service officers as the users need to be posted. In fact the integration has to be extended to all the wings of the Department of Defence production. The specifics can be worked out by a study. In the UK and some other countries, they function with the concept of forming integrated project teams of professionals of various disciplines for development and production of the equipment systems, as we have done for the Brahmos missile system. In the UK the scientific laboratories are not with the DRDO but are part of the production agencies. In France they have the General department of Armament(GDA), directly under the minister consisting of the professionals from various disciplines for development, production and induction of defence equipment in the armed forces.

8. The nuclear weapons further highlight the need for integration between the military, and the civil as the “delivery systems' are held and operated by the Services and the “warheads' are held by the DRDO and the decision making is by the government. For exercising the nuclear option many inputs are required from the various stake holders. Similarly the defence communications need to be integrated. There is a need to make tangible progress in the integration of the MOD and the military in many fields such as training, Air defence, common user items of UAVs, helicopters and human resource management and the logistics management. It is therefore, imperative that the Reforms recommended by the Kargil Committee Report are dusted out and implemented fully.

Gilgit, POK and Baltistan, Have we given them up?

Gilgit, Baltistan and POK - Have we given them up?

By

Lt. General Chandra Shekhar AVSM PVSM (Retd.)

Boundary disputes have been perennial features of the developing countries, particularly of those who have inherited unresolved borders, due to historical reasons at the time of their independence from colonial rulers. India has disputed land borders with China on our vast Northern mountainous frontier, as a result of the historical legacy of non-demarcated borders, and with Pakistan over the unresolved issue of Jammu & Kashmir after the Indo-Pak war of 1947-48. The Sino-Indian border dispute is a complex issue and has defied a solution in spite of the 16 rounds of talks held at the level of the Special representatives of the two countries. It is a subject of ongoing negotiations while the cooperation in other fields is being sustained.

1. Pakistan used its military in 1947-48 to grab Kashmir once the state acceded to India. Just as we had attained military ascendancy in dealing with Pakistan in J & K and regained control over the bulk of the state, our political leaders held us back and took the issue to the United Nations for settlement. The acceptance of the UN resolution and the consequent cease-fire on the Line of Control, left various territories under Pakistani control in areas- Mirpur-Muzzfarabad (POK) and Gilgit, (Northern Areas). We continue to pay the price for that decision even today, without any acceptable solution in sight.

2. Today, the Kashmir dispute has acquired multiple dimensions and is defined by the complex intersection of an external dispute on the issue of sovereignty and the internal dimension of the Kashmiri people, who are divided between India and Pakistan and either demanding self-rule -“azadi” or joining one of the political parties. These issues have to be examined at the political, diplomatic, military, economic and social fronts between all the stake-holders. Talks have to be revived, so as to arrive at a mutually agreed solution, while cross-border terrorism and fundamentalist forces within the state have to be dealt with firmly. The media, civil society, and the intelligentsia also have a significant role in shaping public opinion and strengthening the nation's will. However, while seeking support from the world community to put a squeeze on the funding and abetment of the cross-border terrorism by Pakistan, we have to ourselves address the problem within the J&K, as also in the territories under the illegal occupation of Pakistan. The international strategic environment, the nuclear factor in the Indian sub-continent, and the changed military equation between India and Pakistan may have relegated military action as the last option. Nonetheless, we need to convey a strong message to all concerned, not in mere words but by actual demonstrated deeds that the policy of restraint should not be misconstrued as a weakness—which appears to have gained ground across the borders due to our undue focus on only political dialogue.

3.The boundaries of J&K state extended to the areas of Gilgit and Baltistan before Independence of India. They were annexed by Pakistan in 1947-48. Gilgit Agency had been leased to the British by the Maharaja of J&K. The lease lapsed on 15 Aug 1947 and the Gilgit Agency reverted to the state jurisdiction. The British agent was pro -Pakistan and was replaced by Brig Ghansara Singh of the J&K State forces, who fought valiantly till the Gilgit garrison was overrun by the Pakistani forces. Baltistan was the western province of Ladakh till it was annexed by Pakistan in 1948. The Gilgit-Baltistan territories, now known as 'Northern Areas', share borders with China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. These are presently ruled directly by the Northern Area Council, which has no legislative powers. The de-facto powers always rested with the rulers in Pakistan and in 2009 Pakistan declared Northern Areas, as its province, which is constitutionally illegal. However, we have not seriously objected to this unacceptable development. Pakistan has further ceded 5100 sq km in 'Shaksgam' valley to China and the 580 km long Karakoram Highway has been built by China to the hinter-land in Pakistan to link the port city of Gwadder. There are reports that the Chinese are upgrading it to an all-weather highway and are also constructing 22 tunnels, besides constructing medium-sized dams to harness electricity.

4.The people of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Northern Areas are constitutionally and legally citizens of India, as these were part of the J&K State which acceded to India on 26 Oct 1947. Presently POK is ruled by the so-called “Azad Kashmir Council”, which actually has no legislative powers, and is controlled by Pakistan with the Pakistani Prime Minister as its Chairman. The Council has six elected and six ex-officio nominated members. Although the POK has a figure-head President from amongst the six nominated members, the real power is with the rulers in Pakistan. The elected members are also manipulated by Pakistan, and have no meaningful powers delegated to them.

5. In 1994, both the Houses of the Indian Parliament passed a unanimous resolution reiterating that the entire territories of J&K state have been and are an integral part of the Indian Union and Pakistan must vacate the areas under its illegal occupation. However, we have failed to take any meaningful steps on the ground to regain our lost territories even when the strategic situation was favourable to us. At the political and diplomatic level, India has not projected its case effectively at the international forums, and has not shaped world opinion to force Pakistani withdrawal from the illegally occupied territories.

6. Even on the question of abiding with the UN resolutions, it is Pakistan that has not withdrawn its military from the POK, rather than constantly being reminded by Pakistan and its friends, that India has not fulfilled the agreement. The human-rights violations and the atrocities by Pakistan in the Northern Areas, and the ongoing sectarian strife there, are also hardly ever projected. National interests are paramount and should not be compromised by pursuing weak policies and failing to build capabilities to enhance comprehensive national power. We should emulate China and pursue policies like the Chinese have done for settlement of their boundaries with their neighbours, where they continue to voice their claims without any inhibitions. In fact, they have persisted in their claims to our state of Arunachal Pradesh, purely on historical grounds of Tawang monastery maintaining past linkages with Tibet and it being the birth place of the sixth Dalai Lama , despite there being no other physical presence or Chinese influence on the ground. The Chinese have even denied visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh for sports and cultural meets in China, stating that they cannot represent India and protested to the World Bank against release of development funds. We, in contrast, have not protested sufficiently against similar Chinese development activities even in the territories that are constitutionally ours, including those in POK or in Gilgit-Baltistan.

7. As far as the Kashmir valley is concerned, our handling of public opinion and the political situation has been far from satisfactory. We have not only alienated the populace, but our policy of appeasement and soft-peddling has allowed the separatist elements to gain ground. Giving importance to the 'Hurriyat' leadership and allowing them to engage with the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and Pakistan amounts to encouraging and officially sanctioning anti-national elements. If one was to compare the tough approach of the Chinese to a person of the stature of the 'Dalai Lama', with that of our ready accommodation of the wishes of the Mufti 'Mirwaiz', the contrast is obvious. So far as the situation in the POK is concerned, the absence of development, poor governance and the lack of democracy are hardly ever highlighted either by our Central or the State governments. In fact, as per the constitution of J&K there are a total of 26 seats earmarked for the POK region. The government of J&K has never elected or nominated anyone from the displaced personnel of POK now residing in the Jammu and Kashmir valley, as floating constituencies to keep our claims alive. Similarly, the refugees who fled to Jammu region from Sialkot, Mangla dam, Mirpur and Kotli continue to remain stateless without any rights to acquire any property or qualify for government jobs in the J&K state. The Central government has granted full Indian citizenship to those who migrated from East Pakistan before 1972, whereas similar status has not been granted to people in the J&K region who have been residing in the state since 1947. The discrimination is obviously unjust and unfair.

8. Article 370, provides special status to the state of J&K in the Indian Constitution and the demographic balance is protected by not permitting any outsiders to settle in the state. However, no such balance or fair-play is being maintained by Pakistan for the POK or the Northern Areas. In fact, Pakistan is actively encouraging and even sponsoring settlement by Pakistanis in the region of Gilgit-Baltistan, which has a Tibetan heritage and a majority of its population comprising of Shias, have their customs and language more akin to people-of the Kargil region. We need to pursue a more pro-active military and diplomatic strategy. We need to be firm and forthright in projecting our stand on national issues and not weaken our case, just so that we may be seen as 'the nice guys'. In international diplomacy, aggressive posturing for a rightful cause is appreciated and accepted. Silence is taken as acceptance of the status quo. In case the territories under Pakistani occupation cannot be restored, the least that should be done to begin with, is to seriously undertake a realistic reappraisal of their status, taking into account the ground realities, at the highest political level. Or else, we may quite conceivably lose these areas altogether. 

Sino-Indian Relations and Future Prospects

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP IN TRANSITION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS.

India was the first non-socialist country to recognize the Peoples Republic of China on its founding. It supported China's efforts to join the United Nations and during the Korean war it maintained neutrality. It proposed the famous five principles of Peaceful Coexistence with China in 1954 and called for the spirit of Afro-Asian at Bandung in 1955. China had very cordial relations with India in the 1950s with the mutual exchange of visits of the two premiers till 1957. However, tensions developed from 1959 onwards, along the borders, leading to the 1962 War. The reasons for the war are well known, and the dispute persists even today, due to the disagreements on the validity of the Macmahan Line, despite 17 meetings of the Joint Working Group. Finally the relations were repaired and the two countries exchanged Ambassadors in 1976. Mr Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988 and accelerated restoration of cordial relations. PM Shri Narshima Rao visited China and signed the agreement on Peace and Tranquility on the borders, in 1993. When Jiang Zemin reciprocated the visit in 1996, he signed the Agreement on Strengthening Military trust along the Lines of Actual Control and proposed the establishment of a constructive partnership with India. The President of India visited China in 2000 and the misunderstandings after India's nuclear tests of 1998 were smoothened.Mr Atal Vihari Vajpayee made a formal visit to China on 22 June that greatly promoted the Sino- Indian relations.During his visit the two countries issued the Declaration of Principles of Relationship and Overall Cooperation. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao also visited India , primarily to discuss the trade and economic matters.The issue of stapled visa's being issued to the residents of J & K was cleverly ducked by stating that China considers J&K as a disputed territory. The recent visit of the Chinese President to India has been path- breaking and historic. .All the issues were discussed with Mr Modi in an atmosphere of great frankness and cordiality.We reminded them that just as the Chinese are sensitive to the issue of the Tibet so are we to our territorial integrity. China has been aggressive on the entire 4,057 km un-demarcated borders on land as evidenced during the recent Depsang and Chumar stand offs. On the Indian Ocean region the PLA Navy is making more forays ostensibily to make friendly port calls or on rest or refits consequent to fighting the sea pirates in Somalia. The Chinese strategy of 'String of Pearls' by creating naval facilities at Gwadar. Hambantota, Chittagong and Sitwe has provided her ability to make presence in the Indian Ocean or develop the so called silk-route. These developments, security access and the basing facilities in South Asia along with the improved infra structure in Tibet provide her a military capability that has to be taken note off seriously , notwithstanding the increasing trade relations. The recent visit of the Chinese President and his Discussions on all the issues with Mr Modi, were more significant .The Chinese promise of financial investments and infrastructure developments in India are the positives which augur well for the future. However, there are the following important issues which persist and need to be resolved amicably to normalise the relations between the two countries--

(a) The unresolved border issue.

(b) Trade imbalance with India.

(c) Maritime cooperation and Challenges.

(d) The China-Pak military and nuclear collaboration.

The Border Issue.

2. The Sino- Indian border dispute is the most challenging issue, divided into Eastern , Middle, and the Western sectors. The 1914 Simla Agreement between Britain and Tibet is not accepted by the Chinese, and thus the Macmahan line is not recognised by them. The principle the Chinese government applied to the Sino -Indian border dispute, were, that the boundary has never been formally drawn but that there is a traditional boundary line; that the two countries should maintain the status quo and avoid escalation before they reach a solution and should be considerate and tolerant to each other. However on the ground the situation has already been altered by the Chinese in the Aksai Chin sector where they built a road in 1954 and call it, as their own territory. They also entered into a boundary agreement with Pakistan who has illegally acceded the Shaksgham valley in the Pak occupied Kashmir to them. In fact after the 1962 conflict with us, they unilaterally withdrew from the territoriies occupied except in the Western sector, where their have been periodic standoffs in the Depsang, Chumar and Chushul areas. They have an excellent net work of roads and billets. It is highly unlikely that they would ever vacate this region. The Middle sector is the least contentious and lends for an early settlement. The Eastern sector is our State of Arunachal Pradesh which they call as the Southern Tibet.Although other than the Tawang Monastery ,which had religious linkages with Lhasa, the Chinese are never known to have any physical control of this region, yet they claim this region. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Eastern sector generally follows the water shed and approximates to the Macmahan line. We have de facto control over this region and the Indian government and the armed forces would defend this even if the Chinese persist to claim this. The troops on the ground are handicapped as in the absence of a demarcated border; and the personnel from the two sides patrol or make forays in the area leading to frequent protests and diplomatic interventions, to resolve the issue as it happened even during the recent visit of the Chinese president to India. Their have been 17 border Joint Working Group (JWG) meetings without much headway.Although, we have also improved our military capabilities, and can hold our ground, we are not in a position to retake our claimed line due to the superior Chinese military posture and better infrastructure. Military solution is, therefore, not a practical option. Ultimately it would have to be a political solution acceptable to both the sides involving trade -off of the territory, as a package deal which only a strong government in the two countries can deliver, as both sides will have to make a compromise to their stated positions. It is believed that such a plan was even visualized between Chou-en-Lai and Nehru in the early fifties, before the stands hardened .

The Trade Imbalance.

3. Objectively speaking, the Sino-Indian relationship is characterized by both conflicts and the existence of common interests such as trade and economic development for which both need a peaceful environment. The trade with China is nearly touching 80 billion US Dollars, however, their is a huge trade deficit with India. The adverse trade deficit with China is more than 40% of the trade, which can not be rectified unless our exports to China are increased. There are opportunities in the Indian Pharmaceuticals, automobile ancillaries, textiles and IT where exports can be increased provided the Chinese reduce tariff or provide a level playing field, otherwise this would remain a serious problem. The recent promise by the Chinese of investing in India in the infrastructure sector to the tune of 30 billion dollars is a good step in this regard and would reduce the trade imbalance.India's Look East Policy to open up the North Eastern States and develop trade with the neighbours and with China are other welcome developments which should be pursued vigoursly.

Maritime Security and Challenge.

4.China has been modernising its Navy since past two decades into a 'Blue water Navy'. Their submarine forces have modernised with their nuclear submarines going up from 5 to 10.It has also added its first aircraft carrier into the service, along with number of amphibious ships. The stated objective of the Chinese modernisation is the security of its energy and trade routes of communication through the Indian ocean. However, its attempts to convert the South China sea , as its own territorial waters is unacceptable and has been rightly challenged by the West and India, as these are international waters. The development of basing facilities in the Indian Ocean region also provides China presence in the Indian ocean. The development of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and the Gwadar in Pakistan allows China uninterrupted utilisation as both these countries will not be able to return the loan or the capitol invested in the development of these strategic facilities. India with its unique peninsular shape and the island territories dominates the Indian ocean, however ,the Indian Navy also needs to continuously up grade its capability to retain its edge. We also need to actively cooperate with other important navies in the region ,such as the US, Australia and Japan to dominate the various choke points, in the Indian ocean region that exist from the straits of Hormuz to the Malacca Straits.

Sino-Pak Nexus.

5. China has always been interested that Pakistan remains a strong challenge to India ,so that India is likely to be threatened by a two -front situation. It is also interested that Pakistan continues to retain control of the POK. This not only ensures that its vital interests are protected in Gwadar, but also frustrates India's access to Central Asia. In the 1965 and 1971 wars Chinese announced support to Pakistan and are treating J&K as a disputed state. Their recent policy of issuing stapled visas to the people of J&K residents and conducting of development activity in the POK supports this design. A muted response by India is likely to convey surrender of our claim over POK, The proposed economic corridor to Gwadar would pass through POK, which implies that China has given de facto acceptance of the Pakistan's claim on the disputed area. India must register its strong protests against the development activity in the POK. The other area of concern is the active collaboration of the Chinese in the Pakistan's nuclear assistance, which can only be countered by developing our own capability as all attempts of international pressures have failed. Similarly our efforts to dismantle the insurgent camps in Pakistan, which are used to support the terrorist activity against India have failed to enlist any support from the Chinese. We should be clear that China favours Pakistan and take this as a factor in our strategic calculations.It is ,therefore imperative that we develop a strong military capability and economic potential to deter a two front war. The nuclear deterrence and the missile development, along with the military modernisation is a compelling need to safe guard our national interests, while talking and promoting peaceful environment for the economic growth.

Conclusion.

6. This is not to conclude that there are only differences between the two countries, as we do have common interests and values. Among the common points shared by China and India are their similar cultural and historical traditions. Indian Buddhism greatly influenced ancient China.Both countries have opened up to the world and are engaged in the economic development and need a peaceful environment. The two countries have same views on the structure of the multi-polar world politics , on the climate change, WTO and both call for reduction of the nuclear stock piles of weapons. On the human rights the two countries are against the western intervention in the internal affairs of the nations.We are opposed to international terrorism and the sea piracy in the international waters. It is worth noting that India has consistently supported the one China policy and the Chinese Sovereignty in Tibet. How ever we also demand that the Chinese should also be sensitive to our sensitivities in the J&K and and in the Eastern sector. India and China both need to realise that while following different patterns of government and economic development models, the ultimate aims are the same and we need to cooperate rather than compete. To that extent the present policy of pursuing economic development leaving aside the differences on the border settlement to the future generations appears sensible and pragmatic.

Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar
PVSM, AVSM.

Evolution of the Gorkha Regiments in the Indian Army

The Evolution of Gorkha Regiments of the Indian Army -- 1816 to date.

It was some two hundred years ago that the Gorkhas, under Kazi Amar Singh Thapa had fought the Anglo- Gorkha wars of 1814-15. These wars culminated in a decisive battle with the forces of the British East India Company—the Battle of the ''Malaun Fort''. The Gorkhas had earlier distinguished themselves at the heroic battle of the Kalanga Fort under Bal Bhadra, inflicting heavy casualities on the British, despite their smaller forces and limited fire power. The British were so impressed by the valour, tenacity, and the fighting qualities of the Gorkhas that they allowed Amar Singh Thapa to march out of their forts at Malauan and Taragarh, with arms and colours. They also offered recruitment to 5000 men to serve in the East India Company's forces. These forces were raised in April 1815 (though the agreement itself was signed on 15 May 1815) as the Nassiri (Subathu), Sirmmor ( Dehra Dun) and the Kumaon Provincial (Almora) battalions. Thus, these units became the forerunners of the famous Gorkha regiments, known as the 1^st King George V's GR, the 2nd King Edward VII's and the 3^rd Queen Alexendra's GR.

A number of Kumaoni and Garhwali troops who fought under the Gorkhas were also enrolled in these regiments. The Treaty of Segauli was ratified by the Nepalese Government on 04 March 1816 to formalise the arrangement. Nepal also agreed to receive a Resident at Kathmandu, while retaining its independence. In 1857, the 4th GR was raised at Pithoragarh (Kumaon hills), and the 5th GR was raised at Abbottabad (NWFP). Soon they were given permanent homes at Dharamsala (1GR), DehraDun (2GR), Almora (3GR) and Bakloh (4GR). During this period a few Gorkhas joined the Sikh Army and the state forces of J&K, though these were not covered in the treaty of Segauli. Gorkha battalions were extensively employed in the Afghan War (1878-80), and saw active service in China (1900). In 1890, an additional regiment in the form of the 6^th GR was added, since the British were deeply impressed with the performance of the Gorkha regiments and with their soldierly qualities and loyalty.

A second battalion of each regiment had already been added in 1886, which was followed by raising of the new regiments of the Gorkhas in 1902, consisting of the 7 GR, 8 GR, and 9 GR. In the ongoing reorganization of 1903, another regiment—the 10 GR—was added. To give representation to Eastern Nepal, Rai and Limbu tribes were recruited in the 7GR and 10 GR, whereas the 9 GR had Thakuris and the Chhetris of the Nepalese valley. The remainder of the Gorkha regiments had the Magars and Gurungs. By 1908, the Gorkha Brigade had grown into ten regiments, each regiment of two battalions, a total of twenty numerically numbered. Gorkhas were also being recruited into Assam Rifles, Burma Rifles and Indian Police.

Regimental training centres for the Gorkhas were established in India in 1864, at Dharamsala, Dehra Dun, Almora, Abbottabad and Bakloh. All these Centres except Abbottabad, were treated as the permanent homes in perpetuity of the respective regiments. The Gorkha Regiments were termed as the Rifles, based on the concept of better scouting skills, quicker pace and field craft. They had no colours or ‘guidons', unlike the other units and carried their battle honours on their drums. Here, at the regimental centres, besides training recruits and locating of a battalion after a tenure in the NWFP or abroad, serving soldiers were provided married accommodation and other facilities, like school, bazaar and hospital. They were encouraged to bring their families from Nepal, and after retirement permitted to settle down in and around the Cantonment. Thus, came the concept of the Military Cantonments in India.

Expansion of the Gorkha Units in the Army

During the First World War, the need for additional troops was felt, and 11 GR was raised in 1918, from the existing Gorkha Regiments deployed in the Middle East Theatre. As many as 74,187 India soldiers died in the First World War; many of these Gorkhas. They fought valiantly at Neuve Chappelle, Ypres, Gallipoli, Bagdad, Mesopotamia and Tigris. The contribution of the Indian soldiers in the Gallipoli campaign was significant, though not suitably recognised by the military historians so far, as recently narrated by the Australian military historian Peter Stanley in his book Die in Battle-Do Not Despair. Three Gorkha battalions, 1/5GR, 1/6 GR and 2/7 GR were in the forefront of this campaign.

The first three battalions of the newly raised 11 GR, returned to India in August 1918 and were located at Manmad. They, thereafter, saw action in the NWFP and performed with distinction. The fourth battalion saw action against the Germans and the Turks and returned in 1919 to India after the War, where it was disbanded in 1920. The Depot for the Regiment, (11GR) was established at Nowshera (Pakistan) in 1918, but subsequently moved to Abbottabad in 1920. As the Nepal Durbar did not agree to provide the manpower for these units after the War, the 1^st and the 2^nd battalions were disbanded in July 1921, followed by the 3^rd in March 1922. Thus ended the brief history of XI GR, a regiment which was re-raised in 1948 from the Gorkha troops and which did not opt for service with the British Army post-1947.

During the 2^nd World War, nearly 200,000 Gorkha recruits went through rigorous training at the ten training centres for the 45 Gorkha battalions. Out of the 1,12,000 Gorkha soldiers who participated in the War, there were more than 25,000 casualties, including 7,544 fatalities. Besides being selected for the Chindit Operations behind the enemy lines in Burma, a brigade of Gorkhas was formed for operations in Malaya and was taken POW by the Japanese, in Feb 1942. Gorkhas fought bravely in the various regions and out of the 31 Victoria Cross Awards won by the British Indian Army, 12 were won by the Gorkhas. Ten of these were earned in the 2^nd World War. After fighting in all the theatres of the 2^nd World War, Gorkha units were engaged in operations in 1944, against the communists in Greece, and in clearing the Japanese in Indo-China, Java, and Indonesia.

Although all the ten regiments had four battalions each, a fifth battalion was raised for 1 GR, 2GR, and 9 GR in lieu of their second battalions which were captured in Singapore. The expansion also resulted in raising of five training battalions at the respective training centres. These were 14 GR, 29 GR, 38 GR, 56 GR, and 710 GR. New units designated as 25 GR and 26 GR as garrison units were also raised for the defence of the Corps HQ, along with 153 and 154 (originally 3/7 GR) Gorkha parachute battalions. A large number of Gorkhas were also recruited for non-Gorkha Brigade units, like the J&K State Forces, Assam Rifles, Burma Rifles, Indian Pioneer Corps, Indian General Service Corps, and Indian Medical Corps.

Recruitment and Training Policy For the Gorkha Battalions

To facilitate recruitment and streamline training of the Gorkha Units, a Gorkha Recruitment Depot (GRD) was established at Gorakhpur in March 1886. A subsidiary GRD was established at Darjeeling in 1890, for easy recruitment of Gorkhas from Eastern Nepal, which was relocated at Ghoom in 1901. The recruits were screened and medically examined at the GRD, before despatch to the respective training centres. In 1903, the GRD was shifted to Kunaraghat, its present location. After 1947, recruitment teams were allowed to visit Nepal to select and bring the recruits to the GRD for screening. However, since 1995 full fledged recruitment rallies are allowed to be held in Nepal. GRD, Kunraghat conducts these rallies in conjunction with the District Soldiers Boards, based on the forecasts of vacancies. After initial tests and the medical screening , the inductees are brought to the GRD and put through the written tests. Successful candidates are sent to the respective training centres. GRD, Kunraghat today is a well laid out facility and provides convenient transit for the recruits, the veterans and the leave parties en-route to Nepal.

Final Division of the Gorkha Regiments--Post 1947

After detailed deliberations by the Governments of UK, India and Nepal, it was decided that four Gorkha regiments (eight battalions) will form part of the British Army, while six regiments (twelve battalions) will form part of the Indian Army. The nomination of the regiments was done unilaterally by British, based on their preferences for the selected regiments. The British were keen to retain the two VC regiments, the 2^nd and 5^th GR with the HMG. They were also keen to have the 9^th GR, as they were considered to be more intelligent and better suited for the Corps of Signals and as Gunners in the proposed Gorkha division. To ensure representation of the Eastern Nepal, it was felt that either the 7^th or the 10^th GR should form part of the HMG. Finally, administrative considerations of economy and logistics, and the future operational employment in the Far East and Malaya became the deciding factors. As 2 GR, 6 GR, 7 GR and 10 GR already had a battalion each deployed in Malaya and the far East, it was convenient to nominate them for transfer to the HMG.

The ' Opt’ Option and the Tripartite Agreement

A Tripartite Agreement was signed between the British, the King of Nepal and the new Indian Government on 09 November 1947, for further employment of the Gorkhas in the respective armies. The three countries agreed to the continued service of the Gorkhas in the Indian Army and the HMG Gorkhas, subject to the individual wish of each man in service being ascertained through a referendum. Accordingly, an option was sought from each regiment to give their preference, including willingly proceeding on release from service. The result of the “opt” was an eye opener, as less than 5000 opted for service with the British Army, and the remainder 70,000 opted to serve in the Indian Army. The ‘opt’ option did not go well for the HMG, as the 1^st battalion of 2^nd GR and the 2^nd battalion of 6^th GR declined to serve in the British Gorkhas, en-mass, in spite of these two regiments being selected by the British. This was also true for the 2/7 GR, where only 40 of the soldiers volunteered for HMG. This resulted in raising additional battalions in 5 GR and even a new regiment, 11GR, to absorb them in India. The main reasons for this situation, were that after nearly 4 to 5 years service overseas and the war, the men wanted to be located nearer home. Perhaps proximity of India to Nepal influenced the 'opt'. The delay in announcing the pay and allowances by the British, also created un-certainty. On the contrary India had clearly announced the policy of equating the Gorkha troops, with the Indian Army in all respects, including grant of commissions as Officers to the competent persons.

Posting of Indian Officers in the Gorkha Regiments

The British had deliberately kept the Gorkhas isolated from the Indian battalions, so that the nationalist elements do not influence them. They had also officered them exclusively by the British Officers. During the period of transition, this void was filled by posting officers from the Baluch, Punjab and the Frontier Force battalions, which went to Pakistan. A few officers serving in the Indian regiments like the Jats, Marathas, and Rajput regiments were also selected for posting to the Gorkhas, thus giving a strong foundation to these new units. To make the shortfall of officers, a decision was taken to promote two deserving Gorkha JCOs each, as the Commissioned Officers in all the Gorkha battalions (nineteen).

The Gorkha regiments of the Indian Army have continued to display the highest standards of valour, tenacity and dedication in all the Wars fought by the Indian Army. Their contribution from the time of the independence, in peace keeping, in the active operations, in combating insurgencies, in the various UN missions, and in aid to civil authorities has been outstanding and would require a detailed narration. This is being covered separately. The honours and awards earned for gallantry in the wars, and the distinguished service medals and the citations in various contingencies are truly impressive and a matter of pride for the Indian Army. Post independence the Gorkha regiments have provided three of the Army Chiefs and a galaxy of outstanding senior officers. Notwithstanding the political situation and the periodic turmoil in Nepal, the Gorkha soldiers of the Indian Army have continued to perform their assigned tasks with dignity, loyalty and trust.

Gorkhas in Other Arms and Services

. The only Gorkha Artillery regiment was raised in Oct 1962 at Belgaon and performed creditably in the operations both in1965 and the 1971 Wars. The Gorkhas have now joined all Arms and Services of the Army, as also the Indian Navy and the IAF. Beside the 41 infantry battalions, there are two Rashtriya battalions (15 and 33), one Mech Inf (1/8GR) and a sprinkling of Gorkhas in the Special Forces units. The percentage of personnel in the Gorkha regiments is now 40% Indian and 60% Nepalese domiciled. To ensure post retirement employment of the Gorkhas, the Army has established the Gorkha Resettlement Training Unit (GRTU) at Raiwala for skill development, and extended all other benefits including the ECHS facility to all the Gorkhas of the Indian armed forces in Nepal. We have excellent Pension Payment Camps at Pokhara and Dharan in Nepal, with hostel and other connected facilities and a Sainik Nivas in Kathmandu. Gorkha soldiers are entitled all the grants for gallantry and disability at par with the other soldiers of the Indian army. The Gorkha regiments continue to retain their elan and maintain their glorious military tradition unique in the annals of military history.

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